

# 2020 Africa Sustainable Development Report

Towards Recovery and Sustainable Development  
in the Decade of Action



United Nations  
Economic Commission for Africa



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# List of acronyms

AAAA	Addis Ababa Action Agenda
ACLED	Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project
AfCFTA	African Continental Free Trade Area
APRM	Africa Peer Review Mechanism (of the African Union)
AU	African Union
DAC	Development Assistance Committee (of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development)
DMC	Domestic Material Consumption
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ECA	Economic Commission for Africa
ECOWAS	Economic Commission of Western African States
FDI	Foreign direct investment
GDP	Gross domestic product
GNI	Gross national income
EPI	Environmental Performance Index
HIC	High-income country
HLPF	United Nations High-level Political Forum on Sustainable Development
IIAG	Ibrahim Index of African Governance
IUCN	International Union for the Conservation of Nature
IWRM	Integrated Water Resources Management
LDN	Land Degradation Neutrality
LIC	Lower-income country
LMIC	Lower-middle-income country
MENA	Middle East and Northern Africa
MIC	Middle-income country
n/a	Not available or not applicable
ODA	Official development assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PPP	Purchasing power parity
PRIO	Peace Research Institute Oslo
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
SDGC/A	Sustainable Development Goals Center for Africa
SDSN	Sustainable Development Solutions Network
UCDP	Uppsala Conflict Data Program
UMIC	Upper-middle-income country
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
WHO	World Health Organization



# Executive summary

## Background and approach

The 2020 African Sustainable Development Report is the fourth in a series of reports dating back to 2017. These reports have sought to assess the progress and ongoing challenges faced by African States in meeting the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) included in the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (the 2030 Agenda) and the corresponding goals of the African Union provided in Agenda 2063. This year's report uses an analytical lens that places all the SDGs into five "Pillars" or clusters: People, Prosperity, Planet, Peace, and Partnerships. These five Pillars break down the goals and targets into smaller areas of analysis and focus on higher-level development objectives without losing sight of the overall trajectory of the goals and targets. The objective of the analysis is therefore to carry out a holistic examination of each of the Pillars, rather than examine each of the goals that fall within each Pillar. To further focus the Report, wherever possible, the analysis focuses on comparing the progress and challenges according to Africa's five commonly defined subregions: Northern Africa, Western Africa, Central Africa, Eastern Africa, and Southern Africa.

## Findings

### Overall SDG progress

On a positive note, African governments have made significant efforts to incorporate the SDGs and Agenda 2063 goals into national strategies and development plans, have identified government units to coordinate their implementation and have prioritized specific targets and indicators. However, in 2019 (before COVID-19), the overall Africa SDG progress score was 52.9 percent with a gap of 47.1 percent. Northern and Southern Africa had a slightly higher progress score than East, West and Central Africa, which scored below the continental average. In terms of SDG ranking in 2020, the top eight ranked States were Tunisia (1), Mauritius (2), Morocco (3), Algeria (4), Cabo Verde (5), Egypt (6), Botswana (7), and Ghana (8). Overall, the average score across all States was 53.82 in 2020 which is slightly higher than the 2019 average, but still implies that, after four years of SDG implementation, the African continent is only halfway towards achieving the SDG goals and targets by 2030.

### People Pillar

The chapter examines the broad themes of poverty, hunger, health, education, and gender. In many ways, this Pillar overlaps with the Prosperity Pillar, particularly given the importance of economic considerations in the determination of the individual's and family's well-being within both Pillars. The single most important goal within this Pillar is progress in reducing and eliminating poverty, the origins of which are multidimensional. Nearly 40 percent of all Africans are still living in extreme poverty.

The poverty headcount remains consistently low in Northern Africa, at around 2 percent, but exhibits a slight rise from 2015. The Central Africa subregion exhibits the highest incidence of poverty, at nearly 67 percent, which only dropped to approximately 59 percent in 2019. Western Africa had the lowest poverty headcount among the subregions south of the Sahara but nonetheless had 35 percent of its population living in extreme poverty by 2019. The most unexpected trend is that of Southern Africa whose poverty headcount rose from 44 percent in 2010 to 47 percent in 2019.

In order to eradicate absolute poverty in Africa (excluding Northern Africa) by 2030, the speed of reduction has to be four times higher than between 2013 and 2019. To reach the Agenda 2063 target (28.5 percent of poor people) in Africa (excluding Northern Africa), the speed has to be more than double relative to the 2013–2019 rate.

Currently, the most alarming concern is that the absolute number of poor people has increased. The poverty headcount has not fallen fast enough to keep pace with, much less exceed, population growth. The World Bank estimates that there were 284 million people living in extreme poverty in 1990 in Africa excluding Northern Africa, compared with 433 million in 2018. If poverty were reduced across the continent, Africans would be less likely to suffer from hunger and food insecurity and would instead be able to live healthier lives, be better educated, enjoy improved gender equality and face less discrimination. Poverty reduction is therefore perhaps the most useful proxy indicator for assessing the People Pillar of Africa's development trajectory and the overarching objectives found in the two Agendas.

## **Prosperity Pillar**

This chapter focuses on three key aspects of Prosperity, namely, Africa's efforts to achieve inclusive economic growth, access to affordable energy, and Internet access as a reflection of infrastructure that is able to serve all Africans. In this regard, economic growth, measured by per-capita income growth, has lagged behind real income growth in every subregion of the continent for all four decades between 1980 and 2019, implying that even periods of modest growth have not necessarily translated into higher standards of living for most Africans, but instead resulted in the paradox of greater income inequality. Within the Prosperity Pillar, affordable energy is another indicator of the extent to which all Africans have access to one of the key inputs that facilitates a more prosperous Africa. Between 2000 and 2018, while there were wide variations from State to State, the continent on average more than doubled energy access, but is still only slightly more than 50 percent connected. The lack of access to affordable energy means fewer open doors to new opportunities at the household, small enterprise, and industrial level. Africa also lags behind in terms of Internet usage compared with other developing regions. On average, the number of Internet users per 100 population across Africa increased from almost 12 in 2011 to 39 in 2018. This represents a 225-percent increase in Internet usage across Africa from 2011 to 2018, but remains comparatively low. Overall, the Prosperity Pillar has still not reached the critical takeoff point for a rapid acceleration of inclusive prosperity for most Africans, both in terms of per-capita income growth and inclusive access to infrastructure.

## **Planet Pillar**

This chapter examines the situation in Africa through an environmental lens, as it continues to face enormous environmental challenges. Although many African States have put in place the legal and policy frameworks required to address environmental concerns, progress within this Pillar has been slow on many fronts. The Environmental Performance Index (EPI) calculated the State ranking for 51 African States out of the 180 States surveyed. Seychelles was the highest ranked State in Africa, at thirty-third. Six other African States were among the top 100 States in the EPI: Egypt, Gabon, Mauritius, Morocco, South Africa and Tunisia. Conversely, 33 African States south of the Sahara were among the bottom 50.

As Africa begins to emerge from the economic slowdown caused by COVID-19, policymakers must not lose sight of the importance of protecting and sustainably using Africa's vast "natural capital" to ensure long-term inclusive economic growth. Furthermore, African States may benefit from the growing attention of the global community to the existential importance of combating climate change in this generation. Hopefully, this will lead to increased resource flows to respond to Africa's environmental challenges and the acknowledgement that while Africa is bearing the brunt of climate change, it is largely not responsible for its causes.

## **Peace Pillar**

Based on current trends, Africa is unlikely to achieve any of its goals for peace, security and governance found in either of the two Agendas. While there are State exceptions, the slow progress in improved governance is generally the overriding drag on the Peace Pillar. There has also been a decline in democratic values, challenges in holding free and fair elections, and unconstitutional changes of government. Africa underperforms on the rule of law, with even basic governing functions—such as civil registration systems—falling short. Human rights abuses and limits on participation also hinder progress. Furthermore, rampant corruption remains a threat to governance, peace and security. Rather than a convergence around African democratic practices, the gap between democracies and authoritarian States is likely to widen further by 2030. Currently, armed groups have failed to heed the calls for a global ceasefire and conflict looks set to continue in hotspots across the continent. In addition, changes in climate and urbanization, a growing demographic youth bulge, unequal access to resources, and rising unemployment may drive governance, peace and security trends further downward, with these trends reinforcing one another.

## **Partnerships Pillar**

While there are many elements of partnerships, this chapter focuses on the critical role of development financing as the underlying condition required for African governments to achieve the 2030 Agenda and Agenda 2063. The availability and effectiveness of resource flows are closely linked to the enabling environment of policies and programmes which allow the resources to be generated and used productively. This chapter looks at the trends in domestic resource management, the composition of financial flows from both domestic and international sources, and debt management.

The analysis finds that the majority of African States are not on track to take “full responsibility for financing [their] development Goals” (African Union [AU], n.d.) as defined by either the 2030 Agenda or Agenda 2063. The analysis also reveals that Africa’s debt management situation is unsustainable. Between 2011 and 2018, Africa’s average debt ratio as a proportion of Gross National Income increased by 22.2 percent (from 34.2 percent in 2011 to 39.6 percent in 2018) or 7.2 percentage points. At the time, the debt service coverage ratio increased to 183.3 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2018. A 2021 study by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) found that 33 African States are among the most ‘debt vulnerable’ States in the world. Africa’s debt position is further compounded by COVID-19 with States accumulating more debt to respond to the pandemic as well as finance recovery efforts.

### **Impact of COVID-19 on the Sustainable Development Goals**

By any measure, the COVID-19 pandemic has been a serious socio-economic and humanitarian crisis affecting the lives of millions of Africans. In the first instance, the direct health impact of the first wave of COVID-19 was relatively small in terms of infections, morbidity and mortality. However, as the pandemic continues, this may change, given that the Delta variant is starting to appear in several States and other mutations of the virus could also appear in the near term. While the health consequences have been and will continue to be heart-rending, the social and economic consequences of COVID-19 pose the greatest threat to recovery and long-term sustainable development, particularly in Africa. The economic impact of the pandemic on the continent has been severe due to a drop in global demand for African goods and commodities, and disruptions to global trade and tourism, as well as the negative domestic economic impact of the lockdowns, particularly on small businesses and the informal sector. A recent report estimated that 97.7 million Africans were facing severe risks of hunger and malnutrition in 2020, compared with 70.5 million in 2019, attributable to not only the pandemic but interlinkages with conflict and weather extremes. Another study by the African Development Bank (AfDB, 2021) estimated that 30 million Africans were pushed into extreme poverty in 2020 and that 39 million more could fall into extreme poverty in 2021.

## **Policy recommendations**

A stark point that arose from the five-Pillar analysis is that most African States (especially those south of the Sahara) are not on track to meet the intended goals and targets of the SDGs or Agenda 2063. The situation has been further exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic that has had serious socio-economic impacts on the lives of millions of people. It is not an exaggeration to say that the current constellation of factors is potentially the greatest challenge confronting Africa since the independence era that began in the 1960s. Under such circumstances, African policy makers are confronted with the herculean task of designing appropriate responses that help their economies get back on track, address the socio-economic dimensions of the citizens impacted by the pandemic, and recalibrate their policies and programmes to accelerate or re-start efforts to achieve the SDGs and Agenda 2063.

In exploring remedial actions, the report calls for ‘higher-order’ strategic approaches for jumpstarting the two Agendas. Three concerns discussed are: (i) strategic planning, budgeting and implementation; (ii) strengthening adaptive policies and institutional capacities; and (iii) identifying and implementing accelerators that are linked to recovery and renewal. A key message of this chapter is that accelerating the pace of inclusive and sustainable development will require governments to commit to strong, proactive and responsible governance frameworks, based on a long-term vision and leadership, shared norms and values, and rules and institutions that build trust and cohesion.

**Synergistic accelerators  
take a functional approach,  
impacting multiple sectors  
in ways that could have  
medium- and longer-term  
benefits for sustainable and  
inclusive development.**

When discussing measures to get progress towards the goals in both Agendas back on track, government policymakers face the complex task of determining the optimal order in which the wide variety of policy and programme options should be implemented, with a particular focus on which actions should be prioritized. Invariably, this will require not simply choosing a series of individual policy measures but rather a bundle of policy interventions—or accelerators—that are both synergistic and actionable in terms of available human and funding resources. In light of the analysis of the five Pillars, five examples of synergistic accelerators are discussed that could result in improvements across all five Pillars in particular and the SDGs and Agenda 2063 more generally. These accelerators take a functional approach, rather than sectoral approach, thereby impacting multiple sectors in ways that could have medium- and longer-term benefits for sustainable and inclusive development. The functional accelerator approach implies increased investment in the chosen accelerators. The analysis of the five Pillars suggests that the highest priority should be given to the People, Prosperity, and Peace Pillars.

Five representative accelerators are discussed that focus on easing policy and programme bottlenecks and blockages, helping to reach critical mass in supporting reforms, supporting efforts to contain or manage ‘derailing’ risks such as the pandemic or other systemic disruptors, and helping to reach critical mass to generate positive feedback loops for policies and programmes. While the selection of accelerators will vary from State to State, the five possible accelerators are: (i) digitization and information technologies; (ii) energy access; (iii) trade, supply chains and regional cooperation; (iv) youth at the centre of development priorities; and (v) promoting innovation. The identification of accelerators is thus seen as a way of developing policy and programmatic approaches that can leverage efforts that transcend specific sectors and can be applied both for addressing a pandemic of indefinite duration and for re-starting stalled, long-term development efforts.



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# Introduction





# 1. Introduction

## 1.1 Report overview and context


The 2020 African Sustainable Development Report is the fourth in a series of reports dating back to 2017. These reports have sought to assess the progress and ongoing challenges faced by African States in meeting the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) included in the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (the 2030 Agenda) and the corresponding goals of the African Union (AU) provided in Agenda 2063. Given the extensive nature of the SDGs (17 goals and 169 targets) and the equally large number of goals and targets in the 2063 Agenda, the earlier reports examined only a select few goals each year in line with the themes of the United Nations High-level Political Forum on Sustainable Development (HLPF). This approach provided an opportunity for a more in-depth review and analysis of those covered, provided baselines, and identified achievements and performance gaps for targeted policy actions.

This report takes a different approach, using an analytical lens that places all the SDGs into five 'Pillars' (clusters):

People, Prosperity, Planet, Peace, and Partnerships (Figure 1). The five-Pillar approach serves as the integrative organizing framework of—and highlights the linkages between—the 2030 Agenda and Agenda 2063. It breaks down the goals and targets into smaller areas of analysis and focuses on higher-level development objectives without losing sight of the overall trajectory of all the goals and targets. The five Pillars closely correspond to the five transformational outcomes of Agenda 2063 which encompass all 20 goals of Agenda 2063: (i) Well governed, peaceful and cultural centric Africa; (ii) Improvements in living standards; (iii) Transformed, inclusive and sustainable economies; (iv) Integrated Africa; and (v) Empowered women, youth, and children.

The objective of the analysis is therefore to carry out a holistic examination of each of the Pillars, rather than examine each of the goals that fall within each Pillar, although reference will be made to key goals contributing towards the overall progress of each Pillar, given the overlaps between the goals. For example, eliminating poverty and hunger—SDGs 1 and 2—are inextricably linked to each other but also to most of the goals in the Prosperity Pillar, just as clean energy, consumption and production patterns and climate action—SDGs 6, 7, 12 and 13—are linked.

**Figure 1. Five Pillars of the Sustainable Development Goals and Agenda 2063**



Source: Adapted from Agenda 2030 (<https://sdgs.un.org/2030agenda>) and key transformational outcomes of Agenda 2030 (<https://au.int/agenda2063/outcomes>).

This year's report also comes at a time of significant milestones and events for the international community. The year 2020 marks five years since the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs were approved by the international community, and is therefore an appropriate time to take stock of progress towards achieving the SDGs. Furthermore, the decade 2020–2030 was declared the 'Decade of Action' for achieving the SDGs by the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General in September 2020 on the organization's seventy-fifth anniversary, with the international community committing to "implement the 2030 Agenda in full and on time" (UN, 2020).

Overshadowing all the events of 2020 was, of course, the global COVID-19 pandemic that continues to reverberate around the world. The pandemic has caused not only death and immense suffering, but also global economic recession,

increased poverty and deprivation, in addition to anxiety and fear for people of virtually all nations. In the African context, COVID-19 has put enormous pressure on governments, the private sector and civil society. It has negatively impacted economies at all levels, strained national budgets and threatened services provided in all social sectors. In short, COVID-19 has seriously impacted the ability of African States, resulting in stalled progress towards achievement of the SDGs, and in some States, lost ground in the progress they had already achieved. All these factors have affected African governments' efforts to make progress on Agenda 2030 and Agenda 2063.

Table 1 shows the component goals of each of the five Pillars that will be discussed in later chapters.

**Table 1. Five Pillars by component goals**

	2030 Agenda	Agenda 2063
<b>People</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. End poverty in all its forms everywhere</li> <li>2. End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture</li> <li>3. Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages</li> <li>4. Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all</li> <li>5. Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. A high standard of living, quality of life and well being for all citizens</li> <li>2. Well educated citizens and skills revolution underpinned by science, technology and innovation</li> <li>3. Healthy and well-nourished citizens</li> <li>5. Modern agriculture for increased productivity and production</li> <li>17. Full gender equality in all spheres of life</li> <li>18. Engaged and empowered youth and children</li> </ul>
<b>Prosperity</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>7. Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all</li> <li>8. Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all</li> <li>9. Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and foster innovation</li> <li>10. Reduce inequality within and among States</li> <li>11. Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. A high standard of living, quality of life and well being for all citizens</li> <li>4. Transformed economies</li> <li>7. Environmentally sustainable and climate resilient economies and communities</li> <li>10. World class infrastructure crisscrosses Africa</li> </ul>

Planet	6. Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all  12. Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns  13. Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts  14. Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development  15. Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss	6. Blue/ocean economy for accelerated economic growth  7. Environmentally sustainable and climate resilient economies and communities
Peace	16. Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels	11. Democratic values, practices, universal principles of human rights, justice and the rule of law entrenched  12. Capable institutions and transformative leadership in place  13. Peace, security and stability is preserved  14. A stable and peaceful Africa  15. A fully functional and operational APSA  16. African cultural renaissance is pre-eminent
Partnerships	17. Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development	19. Africa as a major partner in global affairs and peaceful co-existence  20. Africa takes full responsibility for financing her development

## 1.2 Report methodology

It is perhaps ironic that this report has been prepared in the shadow of the COVID-19 pandemic which severely limited in-person dialogues and required extensive use of virtual consultations and discussions with officials and practitioners, as well as with African and international scholars and experts. Working Groups were assembled and virtual workshops were held to establish the overall framework and parameters of the Report, followed by the commissioning of a series of background papers that examined each of the five Pillars. The data for the analysis for the background papers came from a wide variety of sources.

To further focus the Report and overcome difficulties in comparing the 55 States that comprise the African region, the analysis examines State performance, where possible, according to Africa's five commonly defined subregions: Northern Africa, Western Africa, Central Africa, Eastern Africa, and Southern Africa. However, the use of a subregional level of analysis creates inconsistencies in data aggregation and interpretation of results due to differences in the classification of the subregions across organizations. For the purposes of this analysis, this report uses the AU subregional classification explained in Table 2.



**Table 2. African Union delineation of African subregions**

<b>Northern Africa</b>	Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, Tunisia
<b>Western Africa</b>	Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo
<b>Central Africa</b>	Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Republic of), Congo (Democratic Republic of), Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, São Tomé and Príncipe
<b>Eastern Africa</b>	Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda
<b>Southern Africa</b>	Angola, Botswana, Eswatini, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Source: AU ([https://au.int/en/member\\_states/Stateprofiles2](https://au.int/en/member_states/Stateprofiles2))

And with respect to the data itself, it should be emphasized that the examination is limited by significant data gaps both within and across States, as well as by limited availability of time-series data. Understandably, African States have developed different approaches and frameworks for collecting economic, social and environmental data that can make comparisons difficult. Significant capacity constraints


within their statistical services can also be a hindrance. As noted above, the different organizations of the States that fall within each subregion have different delineations. These limitations notwithstanding, the broad trends and challenges facing African States do emerge from the analysis and provide a foundation for the policy recommendations that are discussed.

**African States have developed different approaches and frameworks for collecting economic, social and environmental data.**

## 1.3 Report organization

This report is organized into nine chapters. The second chapter looks specifically at some of the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic and their implication on the achievement of the SDGs. The third chapter provides a brief overview of SDG progress building on the 'Africa SDG Index and Dashboards Report 2020' (Sustainable Development Goals Center for Africa [SDGC/A], 2020). The chapter sets the stage for the next chapters that offer a more in-depth analysis of the five Pillars. Chapter four focuses on the first Pillar comprising poverty, health, education and food security. The fifth chapter examines the Prosperity Pillar and the goals associated with sustainable and inclusive economic development. Chapter six explores the Planet Pillar, covering the goals associated with environment, biodiversity and habitat. Chapter seven presents the Peace Pillar, and those goals associated with achieving improved governance, peace and human security. The next chapter discusses the fifth Pillar, Partnerships, and those goals associated with expanding means of implementation to forcefully meet the challenges and ambition of the SDGs by 2030 and making progress in advancing the 2063 Agenda. This chapter focuses on development financing, institutional synergies and technology transfer. The final chapter provides major conclusions and policy recommendations based on the analysis in the preceding chapters.

**In-depth analysis of the five Pillars. Conclusions and policy recommendations based on the analysis.**





# COVID-19 impacts on the 2030 Agenda and Agenda 2063

## 2. COVID-19 impacts on the 2030 Agenda and Agenda 2063

The COVID-19 pandemic has had, and will continue to have, major negative implications for both the 2030 Agenda and Agenda 2063 and the five pillars in the near- and, potentially, longer-term. This chapter examines some of the consequences of COVID-19 on Africa's development trajectory and the concerns that are being raised by African governments and the international community at large during a decade that was meant to be focused on accelerating progress on SDGs. By any measure, the COVID-19 pandemic has been a serious socio-economic and humanitarian crisis affecting the lives of millions of Africans, with significant implications for all five Pillars of sustainable development. There is growing availability of data on the impacts of COVID-19 on the populations of the subregions but, to date, the data paint an incomplete picture of the disease's full ramifications, both in terms of health impacts and other socio-economic consequences.

### 2.1 Health impacts

It is generally believed that the direct health impact of COVID-19 has so far been relatively small in Africa in terms of infections, morbidity and mortality during the first wave of the virus. This may be changing, however, as the Delta variant is starting to appear in several States and other mutations of the virus could appear (as discussed below). Table 3 offers a comparison of COVID-19 cases and deaths by WHO-defined regions as at June 2021. As the table reveals, the number of COVID-19 cases and deaths is relatively low compared with the Americas or Europe. However, it is alarming that this same epidemiological update from WHO shows that Africa has the highest weekly change in new COVID-19 cases, increasing by 34 percent. This compares to weekly increases of -1 percent for the Americas, 10 percent for Europe and -6 percent for the Western Pacific.

Table 3. COVID-19 cases and fatalities in Africa and selected regions (as at June 2021)


Region	Cumulative cases	% of total	Cumulative deaths	% of total
Africa	3,968,421	2%	94,323	2%
Americas	71,812,677	40%	1,887,752	48%
Eastern Mediterranean	10,887,414	10%	215,325	5%
Europe	55,713,043	23%	1,181,135	30%
South-Eastern Asia	34,606,211	19%	484,397	12%
Western Pacific	3,503,601	2%	53,826	1%
Global	180,492,131	100%	3,916,771	100%

Source: Compiled using <https://covid19.who.int/>

Figure 2 presents somewhat older estimates from the University of Oxford showing cumulative cases and deaths in graphical form. These estimates show a higher number

of cases and deaths even in March compared with WHO estimates for June 2021, further reflecting data ambiguity.

**Figure 2. Total cumulative COVID-19 cases and deaths (February 2020–March 2021)**



Source: Compiled using <https://ourworldindata.org/covid-deaths>

Earlier in the pandemic, various reasons were given for the difference between infection and mortality rates in Africa and those in other regions. First, a high share of the population in Africa is young and therefore less susceptible to the effects of the virus. Second, most African States introduced robust containment and lockdown measures that probably reduced the spread of the disease. Third, the overall prevalence of non-communicable diseases such as obesity, diabetes and coronary disease is lower in Africa compared with Europe, Latin America and North America; it is these underlying diseases that are commonly associated with higher COVID-19 mortality rates. Fourth, several African States have had experience battling other kinds of diseases and outbreaks

(for example, Ebola and tuberculosis), enabling them to take relatively swift preventive action. Finally, and perhaps most crucially, the lack of comprehensive data and the ongoing and evolving nature of the pandemic suggests that actual cases may have been, and are being, significantly undercounted due to lack of testing capacity and some States' reluctance to track or share data.

The relatively low morbidity and mortality rates from COVID-19 to date should not disguise the fact that African States have discouragingly low COVID-19 vaccination rates compared with other regions of the world. For example,

the vaccination rates per 100 population in certain African States are low: Kenya, 1.6; Djibouti, 1.1; Ethiopia, 1; Uganda, 0.9; Somalia, 0.8; Sudan, 0.3; and South Sudan, <0.1 (Holder, 2021). As at June 2021, African States had received only slightly more than 2 percent of the approximately 3.1 billion doses that had been administered globally (<https://covid19.who.int/>).

More recently, there has been growing concern that African States are facing a third wave of COVID-19 infections that threatens to be even more brutal than the two that came before. Across Africa, between June and July, cases rose by nearly 200 percent. The continent just surpassed its worst-ever week in the pandemic, and WHO has warned that cases are doubling every three weeks. Over a dozen States have already reported their highest rates of infection since the start of the pandemic, with over 700,000 confirmed cases reported in May and June 2021 ([www.one.org/africa/issues/covid-19-tracker/](http://www.one.org/africa/issues/covid-19-tracker/)).

The situation is particularly dire in Africa (excluding Northern Africa), where the COVID-19 infection rate is now the fastest in the world. In some States, confirmed infections rates are already more than double, or even triple, their January peaks. The sharp rise in infections is thought to be driven primarily by the spread of the Delta variant, estimated to be 60 percent more transmissible. Twelve African States have now detected 'variants of concern'; the Delta variant has been identified by nine of these States. While COVID-19 was previously considered by some to be a 'city disease,' infections are now spreading in rural areas. Moreover, testing rates in Africa are woefully low, meaning many cases could be going undetected. Even in Namibia, which is currently carrying out more tests per capita than any other African State, the rate is over 10 times lower than in the United Kingdom. One in every three tests is coming back positive, compared with 1 in every 70 in the United Kingdom ([www.one.org/africa/issues/covid-19-tracker/](http://www.one.org/africa/issues/covid-19-tracker/)).

## 2.2 Socio-economic impacts

While the health consequences have been heart-rending, the social and economic consequences of COVID-19 pose the greatest threat to recovery and long-term sustainable development. By all accounts, the economic impact of the

pandemic on the region has been severe due to a drop in global demand for African goods and commodities, disruptions in global trade and tourism as well as the domestic economic impact caused by lockdowns, particularly on small businesses and the informal sector. A recent study by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) indicates that the continent's real GDP is estimated to have contracted by 3.2 percent in 2020 due to declines in investment and consumption (ECA, 2021). Real GDP is projected to rebound up to 3.6 percent in 2021 and 3.8 percent in 2022. Key drivers for the recovery include higher commodity prices, increasing global demand, agricultural sector growth and the partial recovery of the labour market; these are expected to drive growth in the short- to medium-term. Further, a recent report by the Food Security Information Network and the Global Network against Food Crises (2021) estimated that 97.7 million African were at severe risk of hunger and malnutrition in 2020, compared with 70.5 million in 2019. This rise is attributable to not only the pandemic but to interlinkages with conflict and extreme weather. Another study, by the AfDB, estimated that 30 million Africans were pushed into extreme poverty in 2020 and that 39 million are at risk in 2021 (AfDB, 2021).

In past years, African governments made commitments towards achieving the SDGs, but clearly these efforts are being compromised by the COVID-19 pandemic. The overall gravity will depend on the longevity of the crisis; a prolonged crisis will seriously threaten the progress made on SDGs at national and local levels, particularly if second and third waves of COVID-19 variants emerge across the continent, requiring more lockdowns and further economic and social dislocations in 2021 and 2022.

In what areas is the pandemic affecting specific SDGs? The immediate impact is on the well-being of humanity (SDG 3), decent work and economic growth (SDG 8), food security (SDG 2), and poverty (SDG 1) as discussed in the People and Prosperity Pillars. Other collateral havoc will emerge due to the interlinkages between the five Pillars. On the positive side, some environmental indicators discussed in the Planet Pillar are probably faring better. For example, SDG 13 (climate action) has benefited from a drop in global emissions, and SDG 11 from reduced air pollution. Table 4 shows the ways—both positive and negative—in which the pandemic has affected the SDGs and, by implication, Agenda 2063.



**Table 4. Overview of COVID-19 impacts on progress towards achieving the Sustainable Development Goals**

Goal	Negative impacts	Positive impacts
<b>1. No poverty</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Millions of people pushed into poverty due to economic disruptions and lockdowns</li> </ul>	
<b>2. Zero hunger</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Some 97.7 million people now estimated to be food-insecure</li> </ul>	
<b>3. Good health and well-being</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Shortages and strains on health care systems</li> <li>Higher incidence of other diseases left untreated</li> <li>Morbidity and mortality caused by COVID-19 itself</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Support from international community for COVID-19 has strengthened some components of the health care systems</li> </ul>
<b>4. Quality education</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Millions of school-age children out of school, particularly in poor households</li> <li>Educational gains threatened</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Several governments established new forms of virtual and distance learning and curricula</li> </ul>
<b>5. Gender equality</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Increased violence against women</li> <li>Decline in women's incomes and employment</li> </ul>	
<b>6. Clean water and sanitation</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Inadequate basic services hinder the capacity of vulnerable people to follow basic preventive measures</li> </ul>	
<b>7. Affordable and clean energy</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Slowdown in programmes supporting equitable and more accessible provision of energy</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Reduced energy demand led to decreased energy costs, making energy more accessible</li> </ul>
<b>8. Decent work and economic growth</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Many sectors of African economies have been severely impacted, notably the informal sector</li> <li>Significant unemployment and under-employment</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Created new opportunities among local producers and consumers due to impacts on borders and international trade</li> </ul>

<b>9. Industry, innovation and infrastructure</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Decline in construction and industrial output</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Collaboration around technologies for improved health systems</li> <li>Accelerated the digital transformation</li> </ul>
<b>10. Reduced inequalities</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Disproportionate impact on poor has worsened inequality</li> </ul>	
<b>11. Sustainable cities and communities</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Increased poverty and worsening slum conditions</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Short-term reduction in urban pollution</li> </ul>
<b>12. Responsible consumption and production</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Increased use in single-use plastic waste</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Increased reliance on local production</li> </ul>
<b>13. Climate action</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Efforts to meet climate commitments hampered by economic slowdown</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Decrease in greenhouse gas emissions during the lockdown</li> </ul>
<b>14. Life below water</b>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Reduced fishing along some coastal States</li> </ul>
<b>15. Life on land</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Poor forced to rely on actions that are harmful to their local ecosystems</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Overall reduced pressure on the environment due to decline in consumption</li> </ul>
<b>16. Peace, justice and strong institutions</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Disruption of free press in some States</li> <li>Increased social/political tensions</li> </ul>	
<b>17. Partnerships for the Goals</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Long-term risk of reduced official development assistance</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Increased international commitments for COVID-19 and budgetary support but shortfalls remain</li> </ul>


Source: Adapted from SDGC/A and SDSN (2019).

Real GDP is projected to rebound up to **3.6 percent** in 2021 and **3.8 percent** in 2022.



Figure 3 below offers a visual representation of the way the pandemic has affected African societies.

**Figure 3. Socio-economic impact of COVID-19 on African societies**



Note: while the framework outlines the health effects, domestic effects and international flow effects as sequential, i.e. moving from left to right, many countries experienced disruption of the international flow effects prior to health and domestic effects. Solid lines depict predominant positive feedback loops, whereas dotted lines depict negative feedback loops. As such, increased infections (+) negatively affect health (-), which reduces active labour (-).

Source: UNDP Regional Bureau for Africa (2021).

As shown in Figure 3, the study by UNDP's Regional Bureau for Africa (2021) uses a model that refers to first-, second-, and third-order effects of the pandemic. The first-order effects of COVID-19 have been relatively limited in the continent, as discussed above, except in South Africa. The second-order effects—those associated with government policies to slow the spread of the virus and economic activity while mitigating economic fallout—are the most consequential in terms of impaired human development and affect all five Pillars.

## 2.3 Long-term effects

While there are many areas of concern to consider in determining the impact of the pandemic, it is useful to highlight a few of the potential long-term effects that could develop if remedial actions are not taken. Four of these are discussed below.



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## Indirect mortality

The economic downturn will drive an increase in ‘indirect mortality,’ which is the measure of people who will die by 2030 who would not have died without the economic downturn. These people will not die as a direct consequence of COVID-19. Instead, they will die mostly from preventable communicable diseases that spread due to insufficient access to food, clean water, sanitation and income. Incidence of these diseases is expected to rise as a consequence of the economic downturn.

Indirect mortality will be dominated by child mortality, i.e. children dying between birth and 5 years of age. The COVID-19 pandemic primarily affects elderly people and had little impact on direct child mortality in 2020. However, child mortality could account for 80 percent of indirect mortality from COVID-19 in 2025 and 2030 (UNDP, 2021).

Countries with low levels of government capacity and low government investment in health systems prior to COVID-19 will bear the largest burden of indirect mortality. For these States, the indirect mortality burden will be much higher than the direct COVID-19 mortality burden. For many of these States, the increase in indirect mortality will exceed the direct mortality burden (UNDP, 2021).

## Development finance

The pandemic has affected virtually all aspects of development finance: slower economic growth, lost revenue from domestic taxation, fewer exports and imports, less FDI (a 5–15 percent drop in 2020 (<https://unctad.org/statistics>), a reduction in remittances, and a slowdown in the implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). The one area that has seen a positive impact is ODA: levels have risen as the international community has sought to provide emergency economic and social assistance, ranging from budget support to backstopping health systems to fight the disease. It has also led to discussion among many countries about lowering debt servicing rates or shifting debt to support indebted countries. However, Africa’s debt position has been compounded by COVID-19, with States acquiring more debt to respond to the pandemic and to finance recovery efforts.

## Remittances

Global remittances were projected to decline sharply, by about 20 percent, in 2020 due to the economic crisis arising from the COVID-19 pandemic and shutdown. The projected downturn—the sharpest decline in recent history—is largely due to a fall in the wages and employment of migrant workers, who tend to be more vulnerable to such phenomenon during an economic crisis in a host State than citizens. Remittances to LMICs were projected to fall by 19.7 percent to US\$445 billion, representing the loss of a crucial financing lifeline for many at-risk households. Remittance flows were estimated to fall across all regions, most notably in Europe and Central Asia (27.5 percent), Africa excluding Northern Africa (23.1 percent), Southern Asia (22.1 percent), the Middle East and Northern Africa (19.6 percent), Latin America and the Caribbean (19.3 percent), and East Asia and the Pacific (13 percent).

Studies show that remittances alleviate poverty in LICs and MICs improve nutritional outcomes, are associated with higher spending on education, and reduce child labour in disadvantaged households. A fall in remittances affects a family’s ability to spend on these areas as more of its finances will be directed to solving food shortages and immediate livelihood needs. The outlook for remittances remains uncertain, as does the outlook for global growth, as both depend to some extent on future measures to control the spread of the disease. In the past, remittances have been counter-cyclical, meaning that workers send more money home in times of crisis and hardship back home. However, the pandemic has affected all States, creating additional uncertainties.

ODA levels have risen as the international community has sought to provide emergency economic and social assistance, ranging from budget support to backstopping health systems to fight the disease.

## Impact on children

Africa was already a challenging place for many of its 550 million children, but the pandemic has intensified many of the crises they face and created new ones. About 280 million children—or more than half of the child population—may be dealing with food insecurity. By April 2020, more than 50 million students had lost access to free daily meals, with more than 40 million of them impacted for at least six months and counting. Moreover, school closures impacted around 250 million students in Africa, excluding North Africa, adding to the 100 million out-of-school children before the pandemic. Learning completely stopped for most of them, and this break has already reduced their lifelong earning potential. Millions are unlikely to ever return to the classroom (United Nations Children's Fund [UNICEF], 2020). School closures carry high social and economic costs for people across communities. Their impact is particularly severe for the most vulnerable and marginalized children and their families. The

resulting disruptions exacerbate already existing disparities within the education system but also in other aspects of their lives.

With respect to teachers, when schools close, especially unexpectedly and for unknown durations, teachers are often unsure of their obligations and how to maintain connections with students to support learning. Transitions to distance learning platforms tend to be messy and frustrating, even in the best circumstances. In many contexts, school closures lead to furloughs or job losses for teachers. Similarly, demand for distance learning skyrockets when schools close and often overwhelm existing portals to remote education. Moving learning from classrooms to homes at scale and in a hurry presents enormous challenges, both human and technical. Moreover, parents are often asked to facilitate the learning of children at home and can struggle to perform this task. This is especially true for parents with limited education and resources.



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## 2.4 Summary observations

This brief overview of the impacts of COVID-19 demonstrates that the pandemic is a serious and potentially long-term meta-event whose overall effects on sustainable development are still evolving. COVID-19 is imposing major constraints and obstacles that affect the capacity of African States to address the sustainable development challenges before them. COVID-19 has put in serious jeopardy at least four of the five Pillars, with the Planet Pillar potentially less impacted than the others. Thus, the pandemic is widely understood to have delayed, but not necessarily derailed, all the progress achieved to date. The pandemic is also an opportunity for African governments to re-examine budget and spending priorities, the kinds of social services necessary in the current pandemic and in the post-pandemic environment, and more effective ways to support the African private sector's ability

to withstand and adapt to systemic shocks, such as that brought about by COVID-19.

Finally, it is important to remember that there is no single Africa COVID-19 story. Only 10 States account for over 80 percent of all cases; island nations suffer peculiar impacts; rural-urban differentiation is evident; socio-economic implications reveal gender biases; and trade patterns matter. Addressing COVID-19 in Africa and designing appropriate remedial strategies require a thorough understanding of Africa's diverse contexts and an appreciation of the role of regional integration in defining solutions, including human development, economic interdependence, and inclusive growth and resilience.



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# Synopsis of Sustainable Development Goal progress and challenges




# 3. Synopsis of Sustainable Development Goal progress and challenges

Before turning to a more in-depth analysis of the five Pillars, this chapter provides a quick overview of the progress and challenges of the SDGs in the African region. For this purpose, this report will build on the reports that are produced on an annual basis by the SDGC/A and the Sustainable Development Solutions Network (SDSN) as well as the Africa Sustainable Development Reports. These reports offer important insights into Africa's progress towards the 2030 Agenda, and—by extension—Agenda 2063.

The 'Africa SDG Index and Dashboards Report' (2020) notes that African governments have made significant efforts to incorporate the SDGs and Agenda 2063 into national strategies and development plans. Most African States have identified government units to coordinate the implementation and have prioritized specific targets and indicators. Among the States surveyed, 43 States

have prioritized specific targets and indicators that are considered relevant in the national context and 36 States have adopted a road map as a supplement to national plans on SDG implementation. Similarly, to track SDG progress, governments are required to identify relevant institutions to oversee the monitoring of and reporting on SDG execution. The survey found that in 34 States, the process of identifying the key indicators to monitor SDG progress is being carried out by the national statistical institutes and 22 States have prioritized more than a hundred indicators, with an average of 124 indicators. However, communication and information-sharing for stakeholder engagement was found to be insufficient in most States, although it has improved between 2017 and 2020. Based on the survey responses, all States reported that lack of funding and resources continues to be one of the most important challenges both in terms of SDG implementation and monitoring.

**Figure 4. Subregional progress and gaps for all Sustainable Development Goals (2011–2018)**



Source: SDGC/A and SDSN (2019).

## 3.1 Regional assessment: 2019 overview and 2030 outlook

In 2019, an estimate of progress and gaps in achieving the SDGs was undertaken that revealed subregional differences, as well as the average for the Africa region as a whole.

The calculation was meant to represent where the States should be in 2019 as a benchmark on the road to 2030. As shown in Figure 4, the Africa SDG progress score was 52.9 percent and the gap was 47.1 percent. In other words, Africa was falling short of where it should be in 2019 by some 47 percentage points. North and Southern Africa had slightly higher progress scores, compared with East, West and Central Africa that scored below the continental average.

## 3.2 Sustainable Development Goal rankings

The SDGC/A report (2020) ranked 52 African States for progress towards achieving the SDGs based on 97 indicators

across all 17 goals. The rankings for all States with available data are shown in Table 5. The Africa SDG Index score shows a State's position between the worst (0) and best (100) outcomes. Tunisia tops the ranking with a score of 67.1, meaning that the State is 67 percent of the way towards achieving the SDGs. The top-eight ranked States are four Northern African States: Tunisia (1), Morocco (3), Algeria (4), Egypt (6); the island States of Mauritius (2) and Cabo Verde (5); and Botswana (7) and Ghana (8). However, these top performers are still at least 35 percent away from achieving the SDGs by 2030 and there has been little progress in their scores since 2015. Low performing States are primarily fragile States with high levels of poverty and recurring conflict in their territories. These include Chad, the Central African Republic and South Sudan, whose scores were 40.34, 38.05 and 32.36, respectively. Seychelles, Equatorial Guinea, and Sahrawi Republic are excluded due to insufficient data coverage. Overall, the average score across all States was 53.82 in 2020 which is slightly higher than the 2019 average, but still implies that, over four years, the continent as a whole is only halfway towards achieving the SDGs.

**Table 5. Africa Sustainable Development Goal Index rankings by State**

Rank	Country	Score	Rank	Country	Score
1	Tunisia	67.10	27	Zambia	53.25
2	Mauritius	66.79	28	Mali	53.22
3	Morocco	66.30	29	Eswatini	52.94
4	Algeria	65.90	30	Libya	52.70
5	Cabo Verde	65.59	31	Malawi	52.64
6	Egypt	65.44	32	Lesotho	52.43
7	Botswana	63.93	33	Mozambique	52.17
8	Ghana	62.69	34	Sierra Leone	51.59
9	South Africa	62.20	35	Djibouti	51.30
10	São Tomé and Príncipe	61.61	36	Angola	51.18
11	Senegal	58.69	37	Republic of the Congo	50.81

12	Kenya	58.54	38	Niger	50.47
13	Namibia	58.31	39	Burundi	50.37
14	Gabon	58.07	40	Guinea	50.20
15	Côte d'Ivoire	57.67	41	Liberia	49.33
16	Rwanda	57.65	42	Nigeria	48.84
17	Tanzania	57.00	43	Madagascar	47.94
18	Burkina Faso	55.90	44	Sudan	47.85
19	Uganda	55.71	45	Comoros	46.98
20	The Gambia	55.53	46	Guinea-Bissau	46.37
21	Togo	54.41	47	Democratic Republic of the Congo	44.83
22	Ethiopia	54.15	48	Eritrea	44.17
23	Zimbabwe	53.79	49	Somalia	42.73
24	Mauritania	53.78	50	Chad	40.34
25	Benin	53.53	51	Central African Republic	38.05
26	Cameroon	53.37	52	South Sudan	32.36

Source: SDGC/A and SDSN (2020).

Using 2019 as a benchmark on the road to 2030, the key findings are as follows:

- Overall, Northern Africa is the best-performing region on average, while Central Africa is the worst-performing. Tunisia has outpaced Mauritius as the top-ranking State.
- Serious challenges exist and most African States are currently performing badly. As was the case in the 2019 report, no State was categorized as 'green' (i.e. progress is on track) for 13 of the 17 goals. Specific analysis of the leave no one behind promise in the 2020 report shows that all African States are currently struggling to tackle a wide range of inequalities.
- The goals that present the greatest challenges are SDG 3 (good health and well-being), SDG 9 (industry, innovation and infrastructure), and SDG 16 (peace, justice and strong institutions). The goals on which the continent is making the most progress are SDG 13 (climate action) and SDG 12 (responsible consumption and production).
- Across all States and goals, the most frequently observed trends are stagnation and moderate improvement, which is a positive development from the 2019 analysis which was overwhelmingly stagnant. The only goal for which the majority of African States are on track is SDG 13 on climate action.



# Pillar One: People



## 4. Pillar One: People

	2030 Agenda	Agenda 2063
People	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. End poverty in all its forms everywhere</li> <li>2. End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture</li> <li>3. Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages</li> <li>4. Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all</li> <li>5. Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. A high standard of living, quality of life and well being for all citizens</li> <li>2. Well educated citizens and skills revolution underpinned by science, technology and innovation</li> <li>3. Healthy and well-nourished citizens</li> <li>5. Modern agriculture for increased productivity and production</li> <li>17. Full gender equality in all spheres of life</li> <li>18. Engaged and empowered youth and children</li> </ol>

The first Pillar comprises the socially focused SDGs, and more specifically, people at the individual and community level, as well as those goals associated with the 2063 Agenda. As will be discussed in the following sections, in many ways, this Pillar overlaps with the Prosperity Pillar, particularly given the importance of economic considerations in the determination of the individual's and family's well-being within both Pillars.

People and families cannot escape poverty and avoid hunger unless and until they have access to a healthy life, productive employment, and gainful remuneration for their labour. The chapter therefore explores the broad themes of poverty, hunger, health, education and gender, highlighting, where possible, any subregional differences and what this means for the overall Pillar.




## 4.1 Poverty

Figure 5 and Figure 6 show the trend in poverty reduction from 2010 to 2019 from two different perspectives. The figures use the poverty headcount measure which is the percentage of a State's population living on US\$ 1.90/day or less (purchasing power parity or 'PPP'). US\$ 1.90 is used for all 50 States with available data and represents those people who are living in extreme poverty.

Figure 5 presents the overall trend in poverty reduction for all of Africa and also for Africa excluding Northern Africa. However, this level of aggregation masks many of the

subregional and State differences in poverty reduction, although it does suggest that progress has been made on poverty reduction during this period, dropping some 7 percentage points from 40.6 percent in 2010 to 34.4 percent in 2019. At the same time, the trends show that the bulk of poverty is found mostly in Africa excluding Northern Africa. Interestingly, the trend line is roughly the same for both State aggregations.

**Figure 5. Comparison of poverty headcount for all-Africa and Africa excluding Northern Africa (2010–2019: US\$ 1.90/day purchasing power parity)**



Source: Compiled using <http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/home.aspx>

Figure 6 compares the poverty headcount by subregion. Subregional differences begin to emerge as the data are disaggregated. The poverty headcount remains consistently low in Northern Africa at around 2 percent but a slight rise emerges in 2015. The Central Africa subregion has the highest incidence of poverty, at nearly 67 percent, only dropping to approximately 59 percent in 2019. Western Africa is found to be the best performer among the subregions south of the Sahara, but still has almost 35 percent of its population living in extreme poverty by 2019. The most unexpected trend is that of Southern Africa whose level of poverty rose from some 44 percent in 2010 to 47 percent in 2019.


**The first Pillar comprises the socially focused SDGs and, more specifically, people at the individual and community level, as well as those goals associated with the 2063 Agenda.**

As noted in Figure 6, some positive improvements have been observed in poverty reduction, but the key finding is that nearly 40 percent of all Africans are still living in extreme poverty. The most alarming concern is that the absolute number of poor people has increased. The poverty headcount has not fallen fast enough to keep pace with—much less exceed—population growth. The World Bank estimates that there were 284 million people living in extreme poverty in 1990 in Africa excluding Northern Africa, compared with 433 million in 2018 (Schoch *et al.*, 2020). Furthermore, Africa excluding Northern Africa now accounts for two thirds of all global extreme poverty, in light of the progress made in East

Asia and the Pacific in reducing poverty headcounts that were roughly equivalent to Africa a generation ago.

There are wide variations in severe poverty among the 50 African States that had available data, from close to zero up to 80 percent. Still, of the 50 States from all five subregions, 21 have poverty headcounts above 40 percent. Overall, the World Bank estimates that COVID-19 pushed as many as 30–40 million people into extreme poverty in 2020 (<https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/poverty-and-shared-prosperity>).

**Figure 6. Poverty headcount trends by subregion (2010–2019: US\$ 1.90/day purchasing power parity)**



Source: Compiled using <http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/home.aspx>

Given the demographic trends and likely growth scenarios and recovery times from the COVID-19 pandemic, global extreme poverty will become increasingly concentrated in Africa. Additional hardships caused by climate change and conflicts will only exacerbate the problem. Without


significantly more rapid progress in the region, the 2030 goal of eradicating global poverty will not be reached in Africa. Therefore, in order to eradicate absolute poverty in Africa (excluding Northern Africa) by 2030, the speed of reduction has to be four times higher than between 2013 and 2019. To

reach the Agenda 2063 target (28.5 percent of poor people) in Africa (excluding Northern Africa), the speed has to be more than double that of the 2013–2019 rate (1.8 percentage points per year, rather than 0.8).

Extensive and sustainable poverty reduction is only possible under the precondition of inclusive economic growth. Substantial growth over a long period had been the basis for the substantial reduction of poverty, notably in Eastern Asia. Comparing growth in 2010, 2013 and 2019, all regions in the world exhibit a strong declining trend (Figure 7). However, the trend in Africa (excluding Northern Africa) and the Middle East and Northern Africa has been lower than that of other regions. Not only has growth been lower in Africa than elsewhere in 2010, this decline was more precipitous than the world average. In particular, the performance between 2013 and 2019 was disappointing: While Africa's growth in 2013 (excluding Northern Africa) had been more promising than, for instance, Latin America, the continent experienced a negative growth rate in 2019.

Even before COVID-19, most African States faced a faltering recovery from what was then the worst economic recession that began in 2008–2009 in the United States and spread globally. In particular, the continent's biggest economies—Angola, Nigeria and South Africa—had a disappointing growth record. Underlying factors were both domestic and external including debt, price and demand volatility of commodities, fragility, and weak governance with slow progress in policy reform. Similarly, other States made significant strides in poverty reduction in parallel with economic growth. Rwanda grew its economy by 30 percent and reduced poverty by 15 percent between 2013 and 2019. With a per-capita economic growth of 44 percent, Ethiopia reduced poverty by 24 percent. Similarly, Senegal's growth was 23 percent with a 16-percent reduction in poverty. Egypt reduced poverty by a third, while its economy grew by 14 percent over the 2013–2019 period. An anomaly was Namibia that almost halved its poor population (from 13.5 to 6.9 percent), although its economy stagnated with negative growth of -2 percent, attributable to relatively good governance, capable institutions and consistency in planning.

**Figure 7. Gross domestic product growth (% per year) in Africa compared with other regions (2010–2019)**




Source: Compiled using <https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators>

## 4.2 Hunger

Figure 8 shows the trends in the numbers of undernourished people between 2000 and 2019 by subregion. West and Eastern Africa both show a disturbing trend, with both subregions showing an increase in undernutrition over the time period. Within Africa, the vast majority of the undernourished are living in Eastern Africa, mainly in Ethiopia, Kenya and Madagascar.

In Western Africa, the majority of undernourished are found in Nigeria, followed by Côte d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso, and Niger. As the figure shows, the numbers of undernourished in North and Southern Africa are much lower. In Northern Africa, the number has stabilized at around 16 million, compared with an increase of nearly 2 million in Southern Africa.

**Figure 8. Number of undernourished people (in millions) by subregion (2000, 2013, 2017)**




Source: FAO [Food and Agriculture Organization] (2020).

Note: FAO uses only four subregions for Africa. Central African States have been integrated into the other subregions (excluding Northern Africa).

Most undernourished people live in lower- and lower-middle-income countries (LICs and LMICs). However, hunger is not limited to poor States and is not explicitly linked to per-capita income estimates. Botswana and Namibia are upper-middle-income country (UMICs) but approximately 25 percent of their population is undernourished. Conversely, there are LICs and LMICs that report very little hunger, such as Egypt with less than 5 percent, Mali with 6 percent, and Morocco, with 3 percent.

Figure 9 presents a picture of hunger as revealed in the numbers of people who are at risk of severe food insecurity, a reflection of the close link to their marginalized economic status and threats from conflict and natural disasters. As shown in the figure, food insecurity is highest in Eastern Africa, followed by Southern and Western Africa. What the graph does not reflect is the fact that food insecurity in Africa is more than double the world average.

**Figure 9. Percentage of population facing severe food insecurity by subregion (2014–2019)**



Source: FAO *et al.* (2020).


Note: Data aggregation for this report uses only four subregions. Central African States have been integrated into the other subregions (excluding Northern Africa).

A key determinant of achieving success in overcoming hunger and food insecurity will be significant increases in agricultural production and productivity. This objective has long been the goal of African governments with support from the international community. Attention has been focused on significantly increasing the incomes of small-scale food producers, particularly women, indigenous people, family farmers, pastoralists and fishing families. These efforts depend on secure and equal access to land, as this in turn provides effective access to other productive resources, supplies, knowledge and financial services, as well as to markets and opportunities for value-added and non-farm employment.

Comparing 2019 with 2013, agricultural productivity has increased at the global level. However, the largest increases were in high-productivity regions, thereby increasing the gap compared with lower-productivity regions. While Africa's productivity (excluding Northern Africa) increased by 18 percent, it remains the least productive region. The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and Latin America and the Caribbean fall in the middle range for productivity gains.

**A key determinant of achieving success in overcoming hunger and food insecurity will be significant increases in agricultural production and productivity.**

**Figure 10. Value added per worker in agriculture (constant 2010 US\$)**



Source: Compiled using <https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators>

Note: The MENA value for 2019 is from 2018.

Major determinants of agricultural productivity are (1) the policy and regulatory environment which supports the risk-to-reward calculations for farmers so that they can make the necessary investments; (2) spending on agriculture at the district, provincial and national levels. Both contribute to raising labour productivity.

## 4.3 Good health and well-being


Several metrics are commonly used to assess good health and well-being (virtually all of which have deteriorated due to the COVID-19 pandemic). One of the most commonly used indicators of good health and well-being is life expectancy at birth. From 2000 to 2018, the average life span for Africans (excluding Northern Africans) increased by 10.8 years, more than doubling the world average increase of five years. On this health indicator, Africa is closing the gap between itself and the rest of the world. Nevertheless, the average African still lives 11.3 years less than the world average of 72 years. Countries in the MENA region as a whole gained 4.2 years, affording that region a higher life expectancy than the global average (see Figure 11). Mauritius and the Seychelles, the two high-income countries (HICs) in Africa, have the highest life expectancy. On average, the poorest States

have lower life expectancies than others. However, there are numerous States that run counter to this trend. Richer States such as Botswana and Namibia are still recovering from the devastating HIV or AIDS effects. At the other extreme, some LICs, such as Madagascar and Togo, have life expectancies that are among the highest on the continent. This reflects other determinants of life expectancy—not solely income—including the quality of health services.

**One of the most commonly used indicators of good health and well-being is life expectancy at birth.**



**Figure 11. Life expectancy at birth (total years), Africa and other regions (2000–2018)**




Source: Compiled using <https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators>

Another important health indicator is maternal mortality rates. While African States (excluding Northern Africa) have made progress in reducing maternal mortality, the rate is

still disturbingly high compared with even South and South-Eastern Asia, with the next highest mortality rates (Figure 12).

**Figure 12. Maternal mortality ratio (per 100,000 live births) in Africa compared with other regions (2013 and 2017)**




Source: Compiled using <https://www.unfpa.org/featured-publication/trends-maternal-mortality-2000-2017>

Within Africa, West and Eastern Africa have considerably higher mortality rates than Northern and Southern Africa (Figure 13). Although wealthier States tend to have lower maternal maternity ratios than poorer ones, the relationship between State per-capita income and maternal mortality

ratios is not conclusive. Numerous poorer States have better maternal mortality ratios than wealthier States. These include Cabo Verde, Egypt and Libya. The worst maternal mortality ratios are most often reported by fragile States like Chad, Sierra Leone, Somalia and South Sudan.

**Figure 13. Maternal mortality ratio by African region (per 100,000 live births) (2013 and 2017)**



Source: Compiled using <https://www.unfpa.org/featured-publication/trends-maternal-mortality-2000-2017>

Note: WHO uses only four subregions for Africa. Central African States have been integrated into the other subregions (excluding Northern Africa).

Another commonly used indicator of health is women's access to family planning and reproductive health services. Worldwide, more than three quarters of all women of reproductive age have satisfactory access to family planning methods. While there has been impressive progress in Africa (excluding Northern Africa) between 2015 and 2020, the proportion has remained much lower than other regions (Table 6). If all unmet needs for family planning were covered, unintended pregnancies and unsafe abortions would decline significantly. Likewise, additional long-term gains from meeting women's sexual and reproductive health needs include improvements in women's educational attainment, labour force participation, productivity and earnings, as well as higher household savings and asset ownership (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa *et al.*, 2017).

**Worldwide, more than  
three quarters of all women  
of reproductive age have  
satisfactory access to family  
planning methods.**

**Table 6. Percentage of women of reproductive age with access to modern family planning methods (aged 15–49 years: 2015, 2020)**


	2015	2020
World	76.5	76.8
Africa (excluding Northern Africa)	51.6	55.5
Northern Africa	70.2	71.3
Latin America and the Caribbean	82.1	82.9
Eastern Asia	89.4	89.5
Southern Asia	70.0	71.5
South-Eastern Asia	75.6	76.3
Western Asia	53.8	55.7
Central Asia	75.6	76.2
Oceania	77.8	78.0

Source: Compiled using <https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/indicators/database/>

At the same time, adolescent birth rates have declined at the global level with the exception of Eastern Asia but continue to be much higher in Africa (excluding Northern Africa) than anywhere else (Figure 14). In Northern Africa, the rate is only slightly above the world average. As is the case of access

to reproductive health care, higher adolescent birth rates are an indicator of girls dropping out of school at an earlier age, of possible unwanted pregnancies, and lost income earning potential if adolescent women had completed their education.

**Figure 14. Adolescent birth rate per 1,000 women aged 15–19 years (2015–2020)**




Source: Compiled using <https://www.un.org/en/desa>

## 4.4 Education

Education is both important for quality of life and a vital input for achieving higher growth and escaping poverty. Literacy and numeracy are therefore important in their own right and key to increasing work productivity. Rates of literacy and

numeracy in a State reflect the quality and accessibility of the national education system. Figure 15 shows the literacy rates by region in 2013 and 2018.

**Figure 15. Literacy rate, adult total (percentage of people aged 15 and above) by world region (2013 and 2018)**



Source: Compiled using <https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators>

Figure 15 shows that literacy rates in African States are some 20 percentage points lower than the world average, while in the predominantly Arabic-speaking States of the MENA region, rates are only seven percentage points below the world average. The HICs in Africa (Mauritius and Seychelles) have the highest literacy rates, although there are LICs and LMICs with relatively high rates, including Cameroon, Eritrea, Eswatini and Rwanda.

**Another important indicator is youth literacy as it represents the ability of governments to address the demands of high population growth rates.**

Another important indicator is youth literacy as it represents the ability of governments to address the demands of high population growth rates and to increase access to education for the youngest cohorts in a society, especially among poor and marginalized families. Moreover, youth literacy is important because youth are the labour force of the future. The better educated the youth, the higher the possibilities for increased economic growth and higher productivity. As Table 7 shows, Africa (excluding Northern Africa) made progress in improving youth literacy between 2013 and 2018, but still fell well short of the rates achieved in other regions.

**Table 7. Youth literacy rates (percentage of population aged 15–24 years) by world region (2013 and 2018)**

	2013 (%)	2018 (%)
World	90.6	91.7
Africa (excluding Northern Africa)	73.7	76.6
Middle East and Northern Africa	90.4	89.9
Latin America and the Caribbean	97.9	98.5
East Asia and Pacific	98.3	98.7
Southern Asia	85.2	89.3

Source: Compiled using <https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators>

Another important contributor to educational attainment is the quality and training of the teachers in the classroom. Table 8 shows the number of teachers with minimum teacher training qualifications by region. Africa again lags considerably far behind the other regions, with less than half of teachers having the minimum qualifications. Compared

with the world average, Africa is more than 25 percentage points behind, and 35 percentage points behind compared to South-Eastern Asia. Conversely, Northern Africa is just 2.5 percentage points below the world average for this measure.

**Table 8. Proportion of teachers meeting minimum pedagogic training standards (2013 and 2017)**

	2013 (%)	2017 (%)
World		86.0
Africa (excl. Northern Africa)	49.7	49.8
Northern Africa		83.5
Latin America and the Caribbean	81.4	83.2
South-Eastern Asia		97.2
Central and Southern Asia		80.3
Oceania	90.2	


Source: Compiled using <https://www.un.org/en/desa>

## 4.5 Gender equality

The final area of focus in the People Pillar relates to gender equality. There are many ways to achieve gender equality, including the national legal frameworks that governments establish to promote, enforce and monitor it.

Figure 16 shows the achievements of selected governments in establishing these frameworks; some States have made impressive strides, surpassing even the world achievement rate.

**Figure 16. Legal frameworks that promote, enforce and monitor gender equality (percentage of achievement on a scale of 0–100, in 2018, in selected African States)**




Source: Compiled using <https://www.un.org/en/desa>

While progress in developing more robust legal frameworks is important, it does not necessarily change social and economic behaviours and reduce bias against women. Figure 17 offers a comparison of the percentage of women and girls subject to physical abuse in their relationships with husbands or partners, by region. The rate of reported violence against women is higher in Africa (excluding Northern Africa) than the world average and higher than in all other regions except Southern Asia and Oceania. In Northern Africa, the rate of gender-based violence is lower than the world average and lower than in most developing areas. However, it should be noted that not all cases of violence are reported. The number of unreported cases depends on the cultural contexts and taboos in any given society, although increased public discussion of gender-based violence certainly encourages reporting, whether the violence arises from societal norms or factors such as conflict and economic stress.

**In Northern Africa, the rate of gender-based violence is lower than the world average and lower than in most developing areas.**



**Figure 17. Percentage of females in relationships subjected to physical and/or sexual violence by a current or former partner in the previous 12 months, by age 15-49 (2017)**




Source: Compiled using <https://www.un.org/en/desa>

Women's representation is also key to promoting and speeding up progress on gender equality and empowerment. Women have traditionally played important economic and social roles in public life in many African States, as well as in peaceful political uprisings, such as in Sudan in 2018 and 2019. As Figure 18 shows, the proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments in Africa increased between 2013 and 2019. Southern and Eastern Africa have the highest proportion of women in parliament, followed by Northern Africa, although the proportion of women parliamentarians decreased in Northern Africa between 2013 and 2019. The data shows that there is no clear correlation between States' per-capita income and women's representation. In fact, the two wealthiest African States, Mauritius and Seychelles, have rather low representation levels, while some LICs have high female representation. It should be noted, however, that formal representation does not necessarily equate with having an effective voice and influence.

**Women have traditionally played important economic and social roles in public life in many African States, as well as in peaceful political uprisings.**

**Figure 18. Proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments in Africa (percentage of total number of seats, 2013 and 2019)**




Source: Compiled using <https://www.un.org/en/desa>

It can be argued that economic empowerment of women is vital to overall gender empowerment and equality. A proxy of women's economic empowerment is ownership of an account with a financial institution or mobile phone service provider and, on a global level, such account ownership by women has increased substantially. In Africa (excluding Northern Africa), progress on this criterion has been slower than the world average (Figure 19). Nevertheless, women in Africa saw a greater than 15 percentage point increase in account ownership between 2011 and 2017, bringing the proportion of women owning an account to 36.9 percent. This is an important step but progress is too slow, with the low rates of account ownership by women in the MENA region commonly attributed to traditional Islamic attitudes about the role of women in family economic decision-making.



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**Figure 19. Account ownership at a financial institution or with a mobile-money service provider (female and male in 2017; percentage of population aged 15 and above)**



Source: Compiled using <https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators>

### Box 1. Gender budgeting in Rwanda

Rwanda has been implementing a gender-budgeting framework since 2002, building on the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework introduced at that time. In cooperation with the gender and finance ministries, five line ministries were chosen as pilots. With training and hands-on support, each ministry had to analyse its six largest budget expenditures and develop a gender-budget statement with specific gender targets.

In a second phase, Rwanda's budget planning process moved from an accounting to a programme budgeting exercise. Every ministry is now responsible for ensuring that women's needs are integrated into its areas of responsibility and budget requests reflect these needs.

Rwanda's experience with gender budgeting is considered a success. Underlying factors include the finance ministry's leading role in defining annual targets, which increases the visibility of gender issues; the discretion offered to line ministries to consider their relevant gaps and most effective ways to address them in the annual budget; and the establishment of a specific Gender Monitoring Office to ensure that gender budgeting is operationalized as intended.

Source: Redifer *et al.* (2020).

## 4.6 Summary observations

The previous sections have examined several different ways of analysing the goals associated with the People Pillar of Agenda 2030 and Agenda 2063. Undoubtedly, the single most important goal within this Pillar is progress in reducing and eliminating poverty. In proportion to the extent that poverty is reduced across the continent, Africans will be less likely to suffer from hunger and food insecurity, will live healthier lives, be better educated and see improved gender equality. Conversely, the large numbers of Africans who cannot escape poverty will still face food insecurity, be less healthy and less educated, and continue to confront gender inequality and discrimination. Poverty reduction is therefore perhaps the most useful proxy indicator or barometer for assessing the People Pillar of Africa's development trajectory.

Needless to say, there are wide variations in extreme poverty among the 50 African States with available data, ranging from close to zero to 80 percent. Of the 50 States, including all five subregions, 21 have national poverty headcounts

above 40 percent. The World Bank (2020a) estimates that in 2020, COVID-19 pushed between 26 and 40 million additional people in Africa (excluding Northern Africa) into extreme poverty.

Given the demographic trends and likely growth scenarios and recovery times from the COVID-19 pandemic, global extreme poverty will become increasingly concentrated in Africa. Additional hardships caused by climate change and conflicts will only exacerbate the problem, and without significantly faster progress in the region, the 2030 goal of eradicating global extreme poverty will not be reached in Africa.

The sad conclusion of this discussion of trends relating to the People Pillar is that most States are not on track to meet the relevant goals of the 2030 Agenda and Agenda 2063.



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# Pillar Two: Prosperity



## 5. Pillar Two: Prosperity

Prosperity	2030 Agenda	Agenda 2063
	<p>7. Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all</p> <p>8. Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all</p> <p>9. Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and foster innovation</p> <p>10. Reduce inequality within and among States</p> <p>11. Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable</p>	<p>1. A high standard of living, quality of life and well being for all citizens</p> <p>4. Transformed economies</p> <p>7. Environmentally sustainable and climate resilient economies and communities</p> <p>10. World class infrastructure crisscrosses Africa</p>

The Prosperity Pillar is directed at making certain that “all human beings can enjoy prosperous and fulfilling lives and that economic, social and technological progress occurs in harmony with nature” (United Nations, 2015a). As noted in the previous chapter, the Prosperity Pillar is, in many ways, closely related to the People Pillar. It contributes to overall poverty reduction and enables States to invest in quality education, health and other development enablers such as energy and other supportive infrastructure. The Prosperity Pillar is therefore central to many other goals. This chapter focuses on three key aspects of the Prosperity Pillar: the continent’s efforts to achieve sustainable and inclusive economic growth; access to affordable energy; and Internet access as a reflection of equitable and resilient infrastructure that serves all Africans in an increasingly connected world. A review of these three areas sheds light on efforts to achieve several of the goals in the 2030 Agenda and Agenda 2063.

**The Prosperity Pillar is directed at making certain that all human beings can enjoy prosperous and fulfilling lives.**

### 5.1 Inclusive and sustainable growth

This section briefly examines economic growth using three indicators: average real annual GDP growth; average real annual GDP growth per capita; and trends in productivity. Each of these indicators offers insights into the following interrelated questions:

- Has Africa’s growth been sustainable?
- Has Africa’s growth become more inclusive?
- Has Africa’s growth benefited from the productivity gains that make for more vibrant and resilient economies?

To examine these questions, productivity trends covering the period 2006 to 2019 are analysed, and data going back to 1981 are used to give a long-term insight into real income growth, GDP growth and GDP growth per capita.



## Box 2. An historical view of economic growth in Africa

- Over four decades (1981 to 2019), 54 African States achieved a composite GDP average growth rate of 3.6 percent, but with extremely high growth volatility.
- Looking across the States, the average year-on-year growth rate ranged from 1.3 percent (in 1981, the worst year) to 6.5 percent (in 1997, the best year). Overall, the average growth rate indicates a consistently low rate of growth relative to the SDG aspirational goal of at least 7 percent for developing States.
- Over this same time period, Equatorial Guinea recorded the highest average growth rate, at 15.9 percent, while Libya experienced the lowest average growth rate, at 0.7 percent.
- Most of the States were not able to improve the average incomes of their citizens. One reason for this is that half the States remained in the low-income per capita growth band of -3.1 to 1 percent.

Source: Adapted from <https://ilostat.ilo.org>


Economic performance, when considering the decade average for each ten-year period, was lacklustre but relatively stable. Movement in real income per capita is a leading indicator of economic prosperity. Analysis of the growth performance of each decade shows the 1980s to have been a period of very limited growth; the structural adjustment programmes and other reforms implemented in that era may have been driven by the need to address the poor record of growth (Figure 20). The 1990s showed a remarkable improvement on the previous decade, although with per-capita growth rates below 2 percent.

Commodity booms in the first decade of the millennium boosted growth but then collapsed in 2011–2019, a period in which economic performance was mixed. Central Africa, for example, reverted to its growth performance of the 1980s and became an outlier in the region, suffering the most severe growth collapse of the subregions.

Over four decades, 54 African States achieved a composite GDP average growth rate of 3.6 percent.



Figure 20. Comparison of real GDP income growth and real GDP per-capita growth by subregion (1981–2019)



Source: Compiled using <http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/home.aspx>

As Figure 20 reveals, per-capita income growth has trailed real income growth in every subregion for all four reporting decades, implying that even episodes of modest growth have not necessarily translated into higher standards of living for most Africans, but rather greater income inequality. Equatorial Guinea is a case in point. Although the State has recorded a growth rate of 15.9 percent, the highest ever seen in the continent, its record of inclusive growth is very poor, with scores on the Human Development Index (HDI) that are consistently low relative to its growth record.

The composite average per-capita growth for 54 African States over the 39-year period was an estimated 1.32 percent. Cross-State analysis further reveals that, annually, the average growth rate ranged from -1.11 percent (in 1992, the worst year) to 4.86 percent (in 1997, the best year). The year 1997 was considered a particularly robust year for African economies. In the period under review, considering the States for which data was available for all 39 years, Equatorial Guinea maintained the best overall growth, at 9.35 percent, while Madagascar performed the worst, with a -0.81 percent

rate of growth (<http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/home.aspx>).


With regard to annual GDP growth, Central Africa had the highest GDP growth rate (4.5 percent) over 39 years, but a significantly lower GDP per-capita growth rate (1.3 percent). By contrast, Northern Africa had the lowest annual GDP growth at 3.3 percent, but the highest per-capita growth at 2.3 percent—still low but notably higher than the other subregions.

The final measure of inclusive and sustainable growth to be reviewed is trends in year-over-year productivity. Productivity is a commonly used metric for capturing the extent to which an economy, sector or company is using inputs effectively to achieve a certain output. In economic terms, productivity measures how efficiently production inputs, such as labour and capital, are being used in an economy to produce a given level of output. As Figure 21 makes clear, Africa, on average, experienced considerable volatility between 2006 and 2019, seeing a maximum increase of 4.7 percent in 2012

followed by a decline to -0.3 percent only three years later. Ideally, factor productivity would gradually increase over time instead of rising and falling dramatically, as seen here. Perhaps more disturbing is the 14-year trendline, which shows a downward trend between 2006 and 2019, suggesting an overall unfavourable direction. Needless to say, care must be taken in using a continental average to assess productivity

across African economies. There are no doubt variations in productivity at the State level. Yet the aggregate data still suggest that there is room for African governments to give greater policy attention to raising productivity levels for many sectors of their respective economies.

**Figure 21. Trends in African factor productivity (2006–2019)**



Source: Compiled using <https://ilostat.ilo.org> and <http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/home.aspx>

## 5.2 Access to affordable energy

The availability of affordable energy is another important indicator, reflecting the extent to which Africans have access to one of the key inputs for a more prosperous Africa. Access to affordable energy opens the door to new opportunities at the household, small enterprise, and farm level. Moreover, energy is an important component of infrastructure, which is one of the factors influencing competitiveness and other development goals.


Figure 22 looks at access to electricity for 2000 and 2018, where access is measured as the proportion of a State's population that is connected to an energy supply (grid and off-grid). As Figure 22 shows, the continent more than doubled energy access over the period, but is still only just over 50 percent connected. Northern Africa performs better than the other subregions, having almost doubled its access rate (85 percent) between 2000 and 2018. Within the subregion, Tunisia achieved 99.8-percent coverage in 2016, while Algeria, Egypt and Morocco have achieved 100 percent access. However, Mauritania and Libya recorded an access rate of 44.5 percent and 67 percent, respectively, in 2018.

Central and Western Africa lag behind compared with the other subregions. In Central Africa, on average, 48 percent of the population had access to electricity in 2018. This represents an absolute growth rate of 135 percent, although the baseline was low. In 2018, Gabon led the subregion with an access rate of 93 percent, while Burundi took last place with an access rate of 11 percent. In Western Africa in 2018, the average access rate stood at 48 percent, with Cabo Verde in the lead at 93 percent and Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire a distant second and third, with access rates of 82 percent and 67 percent, respectively. At 14 percent, Burkina Faso had the

lowest access rate in the subregion.

In Eastern Africa, the average electricity access rate was 55 percent. In 2018, Seychelles led with an access rate of 100 percent, while Madagascar had only 26 percent. In Southern Africa, the subregional average stood at nearly 50.7 percent of the population in 2018. South Africa led the group with an access rate of 91 percent, in contrast to Malawi at 18 percent.

**Figure 22. Access to energy by subregion (%) (2000 and 2018)**




Source: Compiled using <https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/unsdg>

Another energy-based measure is access to clean fuels and improved cooking technologies, such as fuel-efficient stoves. Figure 23 compares clean fuel access across the five subregions and an all-Africa average for 2000 and 2016. As Figure 23 shows, all subregions made limited progress over the 16-year period, and only Northern Africa had more than 50 percent access both in 2000 and 2016. Middle, Eastern and Western Africa did not achieve even 25 percent access by 2016. Southern Africa fares somewhat better with 36 percent access by 2016. Limited access to clean energy is an economic indicator of households' inability to afford better

fuel sources as well as the increased opportunity costs of fetching firewood, a role traditionally performed by women and girls. Moreover, environmental and natural resource management pressures are created by the use of traditional fuel sources.

**Figure 23. Access to clean fuels and technology for cooking (%) (2000 and 2016)**



Source: Compiled using <https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/unsdg>

The subregional averages mask many differences at the individual State level. In Central Africa, Gabon led in 2016 with 79 percent access to clean cooking fuels and technologies while Burundi had only 0.85 percent access. In Eastern Africa in 2016, Mauritius led with 93 percent access, closely followed by Seychelles with 90 percent access, while in Madagascar, Rwanda, South Sudan and Uganda, access was less than 1 percent.


Most people in Northern Africa had access to clean cooking fuels and technologies in 2016, except in Mauritania, where the access rate was 46.6 percent. All other States except Libya (no data available) had an access rate of over 90 percent. Tunisia had the highest access rate at 99 percent. In Southern Africa, South Africa led with an access rate of nearly 85 percent, while Malawi and Mozambique had access rates of 2.5 and 3.7 percent, respectively. In Western Africa, the access rate remained relatively low, averaging 12 percent in 2016. Cabo Verde was the clear subregional leader with an access rate of 71 percent.

## 5.3 Internet access

Internet access reflects a State's ability to deploy technology to spur inclusive economic growth and innovation. Internet access is increasingly seen as an important technology across a broad range of sectors, including government services, trade, growth of small- and medium-sized enterprises, agriculture, health and education.

Access to the Internet is usually measured by the number of Internet users per 100 population in any locality. Figure 24 shows trends compiled by the International Telecommunications Union for Africa, comparing different regions and the world average. The data show that Africa lags behind South-Eastern Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and the rest of the world. On average, the number of Internet users per every 100 population across Africa increased from almost 12 in 2011 to 39 in 2018. This represents a 225-percent increase in Internet usage across Africa from 2011 to 2018. While significant, the continent still needs a much stronger push to catch up with the rest of the world in accordance with the goals of Agenda 2063 and the 2030 Agenda.

**Figure 24. Number of Internet users per 100 population in Africa and other regions (2011–2018)**




Source: International Telecommunications Union (2020)

At the subregional level, there are considerable differences in Internet access, as shown in the two figures that follow.

Figure 25 presents the percentage of Internet users in each subregion as a proportion of all Internet users in Africa. Northern Africa accounts for one third of all users, followed

by Southern Africa with approximately 21 percent of users. Central Africa has the lowest percentage, with 14 percent of total users.

**Figure 25. Percentage of Internet users by subregion as a proportion of total African users (average for 2011–2018)**




Source: <https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/indicators/database/>

Figure 26 presents the subregional trends for Internet access for the period 2011–2019 as the number of users per 100 population per subregion. Northern Africa has the highest access, with nearly 18 users per 100 population in 2019. Western and Southern Africa both saw an increase in access

for the period and have the next highest rates of access, with 8 users per 100 population in 2019. Both Eastern and Central Africa fall below the average for African States (excluding Northern Africa) of 5.4 users per 100 population.

**Figure 26. Subregional trends in Internet users (percentage per 100 population) (2011–2019)**



Source: Compiled using <https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/indicators/database/>

Although more research is needed to unpack the state of Internet access in various subregions and States, one plausible explanation for current data could be the existence of civil conflicts and other socio-economic factors like poverty and political unrest that can undermine external investment in this critical sector.

## 5.4 Summary observations

This discussion of the Prosperity Pillar depicts an Africa that, broadly speaking, has still not established the conditions necessary for a rapid acceleration of inclusive prosperity for all Africans. Even before the COVID-19 pandemic, the majority of African States were experiencing, on average, only modest economic growth, which, because of population growth, equated to even lower per-capita economic growth. Moreover, the slow uptake of clean fuels and technologies and limited Internet access are proxy indicators of an Africa that is well behind other developing regions in terms of access to goods and services that are

increasingly being taken for granted in other parts of the world. For far too many Africans, limited access to energy, clean fuel technologies and the Internet reflects the slow pace of investments in these technologies as well as limited demand due to ongoing poverty conditions that preclude access to such technologies.

There are, nonetheless, several African States to which these conclusions do not apply. The Northern African States (with the exception of Mauritania and now Libya) have been the outliers in the analysis, consistently performing higher than their neighbours south of the Sahara. Likewise, States such as Botswana and Mauritius have historically performed better than their regional neighbours. More recently, States such as Ghana, Namibia, Rwanda and Senegal have made great strides in reducing poverty and addressing longstanding structural barriers to more prosperous economies.

The slow pace in per-capita growth can be linked, in part, to the ongoing need to improve the macroeconomic policy environment and to reduce or simplify the counterproductive system of ponderous rules, regulations and barriers that hinder African businesses of all sizes, down to the level of the household. It is hoped that the new Africa Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) trade agreement will facilitate some of the necessary changes.

As discussed in the chapters on the Peace and Partnerships Pillars, the efforts of many States to improve the lives of their citizens are being impeded by the persistent conflict and civic strife that severely undermines the foundations of per-capita economic growth, fending off the critical investments that are needed for African States to improve productivity and make valued-added strides forward in output. Conflict and strife, coupled with endemic corruption, discourage risk-taking by African entrepreneurs, while encouraging rent-seeking behaviour by economic and political elites.



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# Pillar Three: Planet



## 6. Pillar Three: Planet

	2030 Agenda	Agenda 2063
Planet	6. Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all	6. Blue/ocean economy for accelerated economic growth
	12. Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns	7. Environmentally sustainable and climate resilient economies and communities
	13. Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts	
	14. Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development	
	15. Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss	

This chapter on the Planet Pillar examines the environmental components of the 2030 Agenda and Agenda 2063 that relate to conservation, biodiversity protection and the sustainable use of natural resources. Africa's ecosystems host some of the most pristine and unexploited natural resources anywhere in the world. Moreover, the environment plays an important role in Africa's economic, social and demographic conditions. The Planet Pillar recognizes that the environment is intertwined with all human livelihoods and thus requires stewardship and protection, even as it is exploited to allow development to occur. In short, the environment affects, and is affected by, the implementation of all activities that contribute to sustainable development.

As in previous chapters, rather than looking at all the associated goals in the 2030 Agenda and Agenda 2063, this chapter examines selected aspects of Africa's environmental status, including efforts to address climate change. It looks first at an overall assessment of the African environment condition by using Yale University's Environmental Performance Index, and then turns to look more narrowly at four specific challenges that serve as proxy indicators of Africa's progress and challenges in addressing environmental issues. The four issues are: (i) water management; (ii) sustainable use of natural resources; (iii) climate action; and

(iv) resource loss and biodiversity protection, including land degradation and desertification.

**Figure 27. Africa from space**



Source: United Nations General Assembly (2015).

## 6.1 Environmental Performance Index

The Environmental Performance Index (EPI) is prepared annually by Yale University's Center for Environmental Law and Policy ([www.epi.yale.edu](http://www.epi.yale.edu)) and tracks 32 performance indicators across 11 environmental categories for 180 States. The Index is a measure of how closely States are meeting national environmental policy targets and the 'vitality' or health of their ecosystems. The Index is meant to capture both commitments and results. Indicators measured include air quality, water and sanitation, waste management, biodiversity and habitat, pollution emissions, and ecosystem

services. Table 9 shows the State ranking for 51 African States, against the 180 States surveyed. As the table shows, Seychelles is the highest ranked State in the region, in thirty-third place. Six other African States are found in the top 100: Egypt, Gabon, Mauritius, Morocco, South Africa and Tunisia. Conversely, 33 States in Africa (excluding Northern Africa) appear among the 50 lowest ranked States. At the bottom of the ranking are Côte d'Ivoire, Sierra Leone and Liberia. Low scores on the EPI indicate the need for national sustainability efforts on several fronts. Some of the lowest-ranking nations face broader challenges, such as civil unrest, but the low scores of other States can be attributed to weak governance and poverty.

**Table 9. Environmental Performance Index State ranking**

1	Denmark	125	Democratic Republic of the Congo	157	Benin
2	Luxembourg	127 (tied)	Maldives	158	Angola
3	Switzerland	127 (tied)	Uganda	159	Togo
33	Seychelles	130	Sudan	160	Mali
71	Tunisia	132 (tied)	Kenya	161	Guinea-Bissau
76	Gabon	132 (tied)	Zambia	164	Djibouti
82	Mauritius	134	Ethiopia	165	Lesotho
84	Algeria	136	Mozambique	166	The Gambia
94	Egypt	137 (tied)	Eswatini	167	Mauritania
95	South Africa	137 (tied)	Rwanda	168	Ghana
100	Morocco	139	Cameroon	170	Burundi
103	Botswana	144	Cabo Verde	172	Chad
104	Namibia	148	Comoros	174	Madagascar
112(tied)	Burkina Faso	150	Tanzania	175	Guinea
112(tied)	Malawi	151	Nigeria	176	Côte d'Ivoire

115	Equatorial Guinea	152 (tied)	Niger	177	Sierra Leone
119	São Tomé and Príncipe	152 (tied)	Republic of Congo	180	Liberia
121	Zimbabwe	155	Senegal		
124	Central African Republic	156	Eritrea		

Source: Wendling *et al.* (2020).

Note: Data were not available for Libya, Somalia, South Sudan and Western Sahara.

## 6.2 Integrated Water Resources Management

Integrated water resources management (IWRM) is a useful indicator for assessing how States are protecting and managing this vital resource. IWRM is defined by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) as a process that “promotes the coordinated development and management of water, land and related resources in order to maximize economic and social welfare in an equitable manner without compromising the sustainability of vital ecosystems” (<https://www.unep.org/explore-topics/water/what-we-do/advancing-integrated-water-resources-management>). It is a global framework covering policies, institutions, management instruments and financing for the comprehensive and collaborative management of water resources. It takes into account the various users and uses of water, with the aim of promoting positive social, economic and environmental impacts at all levels, including the transboundary level, where appropriate.

According to UNEP data (UNEP, 2018), Africa attained on average 40 percent implementation of IWRM, compared with a world average of 49 percent, meaning the targets were comparatively well achieved. Some States attained medium to high scores (51–70 percent) in IWRM implementation. These States include Benin, Burkina Faso, Kenya, Mali, Mozambique, Morocco, Namibia, Senegal, South Africa, Tunisia, Uganda and Zimbabwe. However, a number of States, namely, Guinea, Gabon, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Somalia, are lagging behind on the implementation of IWRM targets, in particular on financing water resources management.

Major challenges to IWRM implementation include:

- (i) shortage of funding, sometimes due to political instability (Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire), but usually stemming from national budget limitations (Malawi, Togo);

- (ii) failure to operationalize, enforce and monitor compliance with laws (Sudan, Tanzania, Zimbabwe);

- (iii) shortage of human capacity for planning, implementation and monitoring (Ghana, Tanzania, Swaziland).

In addition, pollution management and legal enforcement are difficult to achieve in most African States, where pollution control systems remain at a developmental stage, with the exceptions of Botswana, Mali, Tunisia and Uganda. Generally, laws, policies and standards are in place; it is the lack of effective implementation that is the main limitation in most African States (UNEP, 2018).

**Protecting and restoring water-related ecosystems, including mountains, forests, wetlands and rivers, has become increasingly important.**

### Box 3. Putting Integrated Water Resources Management into practice

Having a low Human Development Index score does not necessarily prevent States from putting Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) into practice. Eight African States with a low Human Development Index score reported medium to high levels of IWRM implementation, with scores ranging from 53 to 63: Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali, Mozambique, Senegal, Swaziland, Uganda and Zimbabwe. These States reported medium to high implementation of policies, laws and plans and medium to high institution and stakeholder participation. Most reported having high national institutional capacity and coordination among sectors, high levels of stakeholder participation at national and local levels, and regular opportunities for private-sector involvement in water resources development and management. However, they reported much lower levels of implementation for financing, which typically hindered implementation of management instruments. With the exception of Burkina Faso, these States reported that the national budget for investment in water resources development and management, including infrastructure, was either insufficient to cover planned investments, or budget was allocated but not disbursed.

Source: African Ministers' Council on Water (2018).

An important component of water resources management is related to transboundary water cooperation. International standards require States to report the proportion of national transboundary basin area covered by an operational arrangement, including the area of river and lake basins and aquifers. The standards track certain data: if there is a joint body for transboundary cooperation in place; the States involved; if there is a joint or coordinated water management plan and at least an annual exchange of data and information. Africa has scored well on this cooperation indicator in comparison to other States in the world. Of the 40 States in Africa (excluding Northern Africa) that submitted reports, 15 States were performing very well. Moreover, 19 had mutual transboundary agreements, and 12 of those had at least 50 percent of their transboundary basins covered by operational arrangements.

For transboundary rivers and lakes, 18 out of the 27 States that provided reports had at least 75 percent coverage; for transboundary aquifers, only 5 out of 18 met this threshold (United Nations, 2018). The States having low levels of operational arrangements for transboundary aquifers are mostly in Africa (excluding Northern Africa): Angola, Gabon, the Gambia, Kenya, Lesotho, Senegal, Somalia, Uganda and Zambia. Meanwhile, relatively high levels of operational arrangements concerning transboundary river and lake basins can be found in Central, Western and Southern Africa, in States such as Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe, making the Southern African Development Community region a leader in this kind of cooperation.

Protecting and restoring water-related ecosystems, including mountains, forests, wetlands and rivers, has become increasingly important in ensuring they continue to provide sustainable social and economic services and benefits to society. In Africa, change in water-related ecosystems is hard to quantify, partly due to lack of reliable data. Generally, however, natural water bodies have been decreasing, while artificial water bodies (for example, reservoirs) have been increasing in most regions of the world. The loss of natural wetlands is estimated at 42 percent in Africa (UNEP, 2018), compared with 32 percent in Asia, 35 percent in Europe, 59 percent in Latin America and the Caribbean, and 17 percent in North America. While losses in Africa are high, there is a need to stem this trend at the global level as water-related ecosystems worldwide are under considerable threat from human activity, largely due to land conversion and increasing changes in land use.


## 6.3 Sustainable use of natural resources

The sustainable management and use of natural resources are tracked through two indicators. First, the Domestic Material Consumption (DMC) index, a production-side indicator that measures the quantity of materials extracted to meet the consumption demands of a State. The total material consumption, or footprint, is the sum of the footprint from biomass, fossil fuels, metal ores and non-metal ores.

For Africa (excluding Northern Africa), the material footprint per capita remains very small, averaging about 2.5 tonnes per capita over the 2000–2017 period. Between 2010 and 2017, the DMC for Africa (excluding Northern Africa) marginally increased from 3.4 billion tonnes to 5.7 billion tonnes, while Northern Africa's DMC increased from 3.4 billion tonnes to 5.7 billion tonnes. In Africa as a whole, DMC per capita and

DMC per GDP marginally increased between 2015 and 2017 (United Nations, 2020b). Nonetheless, Africa had the lowest DMC per capita of any region for this period, as shown in Figure 28. From an environmental perspective, low levels of consumption connotes less pollution and thus better environmental health.

**Figure 28. Domestic material consumption per capita (2000–2017)**




Source: Compiled using <https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/indicators/database/>

The second measure of sustainable resource management relates to food loss and food waste. The Food Loss Index captures food losses that occur from production up to (but not including) the retail level. Global targets for 2030 call for per-capita food waste at the retail and consumer levels to be halved and food losses reduced along production and supply chains, including post-harvest losses (FAO *et al.*, 2020). Data for this indicator are scarce, but Africa (excluding Northern Africa) recorded 14 percent food losses in 2016, mostly from production and post-harvest handling and storage losses (Figure 29). Other regions of the world have higher food losses, notably Central and Southern Asia (20.7 percent), followed by Europe and North America (15.7 percent). Australia and New Zealand have the lowest food losses (5.8 percent). High food losses represent a critical waste of resources, as well as negatively impacting health and nutrition and causing agricultural income to be lost.

**High food losses represent a critical waste of resources, as well as negatively impacting health and nutrition and causing agricultural income to be lost.**

**Figure 29. Proportion of food lost by region (2016)**



Source: United Nations (2020b).

## 6.4 Climate action

In recent years, climate change and the growing dangers it poses to all States and peoples has received increasing attention. African States face the bitter irony of contributing less to the emissions that cause climate change compared with other regions but being the most affected by climate change. In the immediate term, this has meant an increase in weather-related disasters—drought, flooding, insect infestations, etc.—that have had major economic, social and environmental consequences. Many States have been paying greater attention to the importance of adaptation measures to reduce or mitigate climate change, which are commonly associated with disaster risk reduction. Generally, Africa has been performing well on this front. The ‘Sustainable Development Report 2020’ notes that 43 States in Africa have achieved the targets for SDG 13 (United Nations, 2020b).

While Africa has low capacity to absorb climate-related disaster shocks, approximately 30 of the 54 African States had legislative or regulatory provisions for managing disaster

risk in 2015. Since then, more States have created such frameworks or are in the process of doing so. Furthermore, by 2019, some 20 States in Africa (excluding Northern Africa) had national disaster risk reduction strategies in place, aligned to the Sendai Framework. This is an achievement, considering that worldwide, 85 States had these strategies in place. In terms of international agreements too, Africa has performed relatively well, with some 32 African States now reporting on Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), another 34 having ratified the Paris Agreement, and 45 having registered with the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change as at 2017.

Moreover, there are a number of initiatives in Africa that offer development assistance for strengthening adaptive capacity, covering areas such as mobilizing green investment and harnessing skills and knowledge for green growth. The Africa Enterprise Challenge Fund is one such initiative.



There are also opportunities to obtain grant financing for climate technologies that help smallholder farmers access energy services and adapt to climate change. Businesses are required to provide matching funds to ensure that grants are catalytic and financial risks are shared between partners. Another avenue is the multi-donor Green for Growth Fund (<https://www.ggf.lu/>), which provides concessional finance to public and private financial intermediaries to set up and demonstrate the viability of financing for low carbon technologies. There are also opportunities to work with development cooperation partners, who encourage a market-systems approach to promote green growth through the development of value chains and markets for environmental products and services, including carbon offsets.


## 6.5 Forest and biodiversity protection

SDG 15, Life on Land (protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss) aligns with Goal 7 of Agenda 2063 (environmentally sustainable and climate resilient economies and communities). Humankind has

already altered almost 75 percent of the earth's surface, with wildlife and nature being squeezed into rapidly decreasing space. Over 20 percent of the Earth's land is degraded, and one million animal and plant species are threatened with extinction, while pollution and destruction of natural ecosystems are escalating (Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services, 2019).

Africa's progress in implementing goals associated with natural resource management has generally been poor, with land degradation in particular posing a major challenge. Africa as a region had the largest annual rate of net forest loss in 2010–2020, at 3.9 million hectares per year, surpassing the rate of South America, where loss was concentrated in States in the Amazon Basin (Figure 30). The downward trend in forest area change is particularly steep in States such as Nigeria, Togo and Uganda. In Africa (excluding Northern Africa), deforestation is widely associated with charcoal production as well as forest clearing for agriculture and settlements. Besides loss of forest carbon stock, a further concern for climate change is methane and black carbon emissions from fuelwood burning and traditional charcoal-making processes. Illegal logging of trees and uncoordinated harvesting also cause massive loss of forest cover (FAO, 2020).

Figure 30. Annual forest area net change, by decade and region (1990–2020)



Source: FAO (2020).

## Biodiversity

With regard to biodiversity, only 10 States in Africa (excluding Northern Africa), have achieved national targets reflecting Aichi Biodiversity Target 2. This target calls for biodiversity values to have been integrated by 2020 into national and local development and poverty reduction strategies and planning processes and to have been incorporated into national accounting, as appropriate, and reporting systems. In terms of progress, Africa (excluding Northern Africa), marginally increased the proportion of key biodiversity areas

from 39.2 percent in 2010 to 43.7 percent in 2020. In contrast, Northern Africa saw a drastic reduction in key biodiversity areas, from 22 percent of total land area in 2010 to just 3.4 percent in 2020. The International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN)'s 'Global Standard for the Identification of Key Biodiversity Areas' (2016) sets out globally agreed criteria for the identification of key biodiversity areas worldwide, defining them as "sites contributing significantly to the global persistence of biodiversity in terrestrial, freshwater and marine ecosystems."

**Table 10. Key biodiversity areas as percentage of total land area**

Regions	2010	2015	2020
Northern Africa	22.0	3.4	3.4
Africa excluding Northern Africa	39.2	40.5	41.0
World	40.9	45.1	43.1

Source: United Nations (2020c)

Regarding biodiversity loss, the IUCN's Red List Index shows the conservation status of major species groups as well as trends in the proportion of species expected to become extinct in the near future. While the risk of species extinction is high in most States around the world, the risk of extinction of endangered species is very high across the African continent (IUCN, 2020).

An area of particular concern related to biodiversity loss is the success of efforts to end poaching and trafficking of protected species of flora and fauna and address both demand and supply of illegal wildlife products. In Africa, poaching and related wildlife crimes have increased, while land-use changes such as deforestation and habitat encroachment have also led to loss of wildlife.

In short, Africa has continued to lose precious biodiversity to poaching, wildlife crime, habitat destruction, over-exploitation (harvesting, trade), pollution and drought, including due to climate change. The Red List Index does show that extinction risk is falling in each subregion, meaning that subregions are still suffering extinction, but at a reduced rate. However, progress is slow in Middle and Southern Africa, where the extinction risk fell by just 0.1 on the risk scale between 2000 and 2017.

## Desertification and land degradation

Dealing with the dual problems of land degradation and desertification are a major challenge for many African States, notably the arid and semi-arid States. Greater attention is thus being given to the concept of achieving 'Land Degradation Neutrality' (LDN), a new term that encompasses the dual objectives of combating environmental degradation while improving the overall well-being of people depending on the land (United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification [UNCCD], 2019). The target of achieving LDN encourages adaptive management during planning, implementation and monitoring of LDN-related activities and establishes the LDN response hierarchy of reducing and then reversing land degradation. Some 48 States in Africa have set LDN targets. Outliers are Burundi, Liberia, Libya, Somalia and Tunisia.

The progress towards LDN in Africa has been slow. Africa (excluding Northern Africa) has continued to suffer land degradation, with 22.4 percent of its land degraded (UNCCD, 2019). For example, in Tanzania and Malawi the annual costs of degradation are, respectively, US\$ 2.5 billion and US\$0.3 billion, representing roughly 15 percent and 10 percent of each State's GDP. Rapid population growth, rapid urbanization, unsustainable land-use systems and climate

variation, coupled with weak institutional capacities and limited funding, contribute to the degradation of Africa's lands and ecosystems. In addition, around 45 percent of Africa's land area is impacted by desertification, with the

Sahelian States being particularly vulnerable. The Great Green Wall represents an effort to counter such losses to combat desertification, especially in the Sahelian States (Box 4).

#### Box 4. The Great Green Wall for the Sahara and Sahel Initiative

The Great Green Wall (GGW) is a Pan-African initiative to restore and sustainably manage land in the Sahel-Saharan region in order to address both land degradation and poverty. The aim of the GGW was to create a long vegetation barrier between the 100 mm and 400 mm isohyets, including ramps, that stretched at least 7,000 km along the Sahel and was roughly 15 km wide. In recent years, this vision has evolved into an integrated ecosystem management approach, striving for a mosaic of different land-use and production systems, including sustainable dryland management and restoration, the regeneration of natural vegetation, as well as water retention and conservation measures. The GGW now covers the three dryland regions of the continent: Northern Africa (northern Sahara), the Sahel and Southern Africa. The GGW envisages restoring 100 million hectares of degraded land by 2030.

In 2020, the GGW evolved into an African-led pioneer initiative to combat land degradation, desertification, drought, climate change, biodiversity loss, poverty and food insecurity. However, only 17.8 million hectares had been restored as at 2018, which is about 18 percent of the target area. This slow progress suggests that there is a need to increase efforts towards achieving the GGW targets, learning lessons from cases where there has been modest success.

Source: UNCCD (2020).

## 6.6 Summary observations

This chapter has described a continent that continues to face enormous environmental challenges. Although many States have put in place the legal and policy frameworks needed to address environmental concerns, progress has been slow on many fronts. Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic has most likely impeded progress further still (with the exception of reduced air pollution and carbon emissions), as governments were forced to reallocate scarce resources to confront the health and socio-economic consequences of the pandemic. As Africa begins to emerge from the economic slowdown caused by COVID-19, it will be important for policymakers not to lose sight of the importance of protecting and sustainably using Africa's great store of 'natural capital' to ensure long-term inclusive economic growth. It is easy to overlook (or ignore) the inter-connectedness of the ecosystems we inhabit with our economic, social and cultural well-being. Doing so is dangerous for us and, more significantly, for future generations.

African States can hope to benefit from the growing attention being paid by the global community and average citizens around the world to the existential importance of combating climate change in this generation. This may lead to increased resources being directed towards Africa's environmental hurdles, based on the recognition that the continent is bearing the brunt of climate change while other regions are largely responsible for its causes.

**Many States have put in place the legal and policy frameworks.**

# Pillar Four: Peace




## 7. Pillar Four: Peace

	2030 Agenda	Agenda 2063
Peace	16. Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels	11. Democratic values, practices, universal principles of human rights, justice and the rule of law entrenched 12. Capable institutions and transformative leadership in place 13. Peace, security and stability is preserved 14. A stable and peaceful Africa 15. A fully functional and operational APSA 16. African cultural renaissance is pre-eminent

One reason for the indivisible nature of the SDGs is the recognition that peace and development are interlinked, and that an integrated and holistic effort is needed to ensure that an enabling environment exists for sustainable development to take root. Thus, Goal 16 of the 2030 Agenda, to “promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels,”

cannot be viewed in isolation. Instead, it is linked to a range of other goals and targets, known as SDG16+, which advocate equality, inclusion and human rights. SDG 16 is closely interrelated with some of the aspirations of Agenda 2063. Aspiration 3, for example, calls for “an Africa of Good Governance, Democracy, Respect for Human Rights, Justice and the Rule of Law,” while Aspiration 4 is for a “Peaceful and Secure Africa.”

**Figure 31. Progress on Sustainable Development Goal 16 by subregion**



Source: SDGC/A and SDSN (2019).


Note: In this survey, States of the Central Africa subregion have been merged into the Eastern, Western and Southern African subregions.

This chapter starts with a snapshot of overall progress on SDG 16 (Figure 31), before turning to a more in-depth assessment of key aspects of the Peace Pillar. As Figure 31 shows, a large number of States in the subregions face major or significant challenges in meeting Goal 16. None of the States surveyed indicated that it had achieved SDG 16. To the extent that

peace is holistically linked with development, the data in Figure 31 suggest that the outlook is bleak.

In addition, Figure 32 provides an overall schema showing the linkages between peace, security and governance.

**Figure 32. Linkages between peace and security and governance**



Building on the data in these graphics, the analysis will now focus on some of the factors and trends that are limiting the ability of African States to accelerate progress on the Peace Pillar.

## 7.1 Governance trends

Another critical element of both SDG 16 and Agenda 2063 is governance. The World Justice Project's Rule of Law Index (2019) provides an indication of governance trends in the African continent and globally. It measures constraints on government powers, absence of corruption, open government, fundamental rights, order and security, regulatory enforcement, civil justice and criminal justice to conduct its scoring. The top scoring African States are Mauritius, Namibia and Rwanda, while the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Cameroon and Mauritania having the lowest index scores. Namibia is ranked thirty-fifth in the world, while Denmark, Finland and Norway are the top scorers globally. Namibia scores fairly high on constraints on government powers, regulatory enforcement and open government, but does less well on corruption, order and security. Rwanda, meanwhile, scores much better on rooting out corruption, but less well on fundamental rights. A comparison of the two States suggests that all elements are important for achieving good governance. In contrast, Cameroon's poor score may be explained by its leaders' refusal to embark on legal and institutional reforms, and their harassment of opposition figures.

The 2019 Rule of Law Index notes a decline in the rule of law around the world, particularly pronounced in relation to constraints on government powers, but also significant in relation to fundamental rights and government corruption. The European Union, European Free Trade Association and North America tend to score highest on this index, followed by East Asia and the Pacific. Africa continues to account for the majority of States with the lowest scores. Therefore, to achieve SDG 16 and Agenda 2063, the focus must primarily be on limiting government powers, enhancing fundamental rights and addressing corruption. Specific elements related to governance are further explored below.

### *Democracy and elections*

Surveys by the AU and UNDP (2017) for 'governance, peace and security in the strategy for the harmonization of statistics in Africa' (GPS-SHaSA), show that satisfaction with democracy varies significantly across States, from 75 percent

of people claiming to be satisfied in Burundi, to 36 percent in Cameroon. According to Afrobarometer surveys, many Africans still want democracy, but only 51 percent of all Africans surveyed between 2016 and 2018 stated that their State is a democracy or is a democracy with minor problems. Only 43 percent were satisfied with the way democracy worked in their States, and only 22 percent of Africans thought members of their local assembly listened to them (African Peer Review Mechanism [APRM], 2020). While there has been a general increase since 2005 in the perception that processes are democratic, there have been modest declines since the period 2011–2013 (Afrobarometer, 2020). The findings show that from 2014, the capacity of election monitoring agencies has worsened and the space for political participation and opposition parties has declined. Therefore, while democratic practices have remained fairly constant, people are generally less satisfied with the way they operate in practice. This is a result of States claiming that they are democratic but failing to ensure free and fair elections, manipulating the democratic system or clamping down on opposition.

The non-governmental organization Freedom House has also identified a decline in the quality of democracy and political rights. It notes the democratic backsliding that occurred in Western Africa in 2019, when five of the 12 States globally with the largest year-on year score declines belonged to that subregion: Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali and Nigeria. At the same time, the status of Senegal and Benin changed from 'Free' to 'Partly Free,' leaving Cabo Verde and Ghana as the only remaining 'Free' States in the subregion. Benin carried out politically motivated prosecutions, while Nigeria's President rejected efforts at



electoral reform. In Senegal, opposition politicians were barred from elections due to the criminal charges, seen as politically motivated, laid against them. Scores also declined



for Tanzania and Uganda in Eastern Africa and Zimbabwe in Southern Africa, but Angola, Ethiopia and Sudan were listed as improving. In Northern Africa, Tunisia was shown to have improved as a result of having instituted a democracy, while Egypt declined due to a clampdown on the opposition (Repucci, 2020).

Elections are considered important for implementing democracy. Metrics to assess the strength of a democracy include the percentages of citizens who feel free to vote without experiencing pressure and the reasons for which people do not vote (African Union, 2018; UNDP, 2017). Proxy data from the Afrobarometer shows that 63 percent of Africans believed that their elections were free and fair (either completely or with minor problems). Assessments of election quality have remained fairly consistent since 2005, but the perceived quality of elections is closely linked to changes in the ruling party achieved through elections (APRM, 2019).

Therefore, States where there has recently been a change of government are more likely to see their elections as fair. This was the case in Malawi, where a 2020 landmark court decision annulled presidential election results from 2019, setting up a fresh election that was won by the opposition. Conversely, in States where elections have been delayed due to difficulties implementing a peace agreement, such as in South Sudan, conflict has continued.

There has also been a worrying trend towards third-termism. In the last 10 years, at least seven African States have amended their constitutions to remove or reset presidential term limits or increase the power of the executive. This has only resulted in greater instability and conflict, most recently in Côte d'Ivoire but also in Burundi and Guinea. The trend towards more authoritarian forms of government has therefore impacted negatively on the continent.

#### Box 5. Case study of progress: Seychelles

Seychelles, despite ongoing challenges, is on the way to achieving SDG 16. The State has a democratic multi-party system and its National Development Strategy (2019–2023) establishes governance as key Pillar, including two governance-related goals: an accountable and citizen-centred government, and a State that upholds the rule of law and human rights. Some of the specific measures Seychelles has undertaken to improve peace, security and governance include the promulgation of the Anti-Corruption Act and the setting up of the Anti-Corruption Commission, as well as the successful conclusion of prosecutions and the identification of corruption risks. In 2018, the Access to Information Act was published. The Constitutional Appointment Authority and Office of the Ombudsman are also important entities for enhancing transparency and accountability in the State. The Seychelles is also part of the Open Government Initiative, a platform that brings together governments and civil society to make governments more inclusive and responsive. In terms of human rights, in 2018 the Seychelles Human Rights Commission was set up and the Human Rights Act was passed. Litigation before the Seychelles Constitutional Court has increased and there have been efforts to improve access to justice as well as service delivery. The government has introduced a results-based management system to be more effective and has also made efforts to address crime, terrorism and money laundering. The case of Seychelles shows that, by setting up strong institutions, progress towards peace, security and governance can be achieved.


Source: Economic Planning Department (2020).

## 7.2 Organized violence

Over the past few years, several organizations and think tanks have sought to disaggregate what is often broadly referred to as 'conflict' into various sub-sets with more precise definitions. In terms of the number of armed conflicts, the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) at Uppsala University and the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) counted 140 armed conflicts in Africa between 2014–2019 (Figure 33).

The definition used for an armed conflict is a "contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a State, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths" (PRIO, 2003).

**Figure 33. Number of armed conflicts in Africa (2014–2019)**



Source: Pettersson *et al.* (2019).


It is also important to note that many conflicts are cross-border in nature. The AU's APRM has identified four major conflict zones in Africa, namely the Mano River region, the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and the Sahel/Maghreb region, demonstrating the regional nature of peace and security. In the Mano River region, military coups and civil wars, as well as political exploitation of ethnic differences, have affected peace and security. In the Great Lakes Region, intractable conflicts have spilled across borders, with external parties contributing to the conflicts due to their economic, political and criminal interests. The Horn of Africa faces distinct but interrelated conflict systems, including cattle rustling, and the Sahel/Maghreb region is struggling with civil wars, crime and terror. As such, there is a need to plan interventions from a regional, continental and global perspective, offering context-specific solutions (APRM, 2019).

Another indicator examines the number of deaths caused by organized violence (as opposed to family or criminal violence). For example, research done by the UCDP showed a small decrease in organized violence in 2018 and 2019, but

only a minimal decrease overall since 2015 (Figure 34). UCDP defines an 'incident' as an event where armed force was used by an organized actor against another organized actor, or against civilians, resulting in at least one direct death at a specific location and on a specific date.

**There is a need to plan interventions from a regional, continental and global perspective, offering context-specific solutions.**

**Figure 34. Number of fatalities from organized violence in Africa (2015–2019)**



Source: Pettersson *et al.* (2020).


Data from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) show that peace and security has varied widely across the continent since 2015 (Figure 35). ACLED collects data on fatalities caused by political violence such as battles, riots, explosions/remote violence and violence against civilians, excluding all other forms of violence, such as criminal violence. According to ACLED, violence in Western Africa dropped after 2015 but has subsequently risen again. Violence has fallen overall in the period 2015–2019 in Northern Africa, but stayed relatively constant in Southern Africa. In Western Africa, violence was at a low in 2016 but has subsequently increased, which may be attributed to the growth of terrorism (seen mainly in Nigeria but also spilling across borders into the Sahel). The reduction in conflict in Northern Africa, on the other hand, could be attributed to growing levels of democracy. Southern Africa has traditionally been considered to have strong institutions and reasonable levels of democracy, which may explain why it experiences less violence than the other subregions. In Central Africa, the low scores are surprising given the number of ongoing conflicts, characterized by elite-level manipulation of ethnic divisions and communal conflicts.

However, there may be barriers to reporting violence in the subregion, which may explain the low values.



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**Figure 35. Number of fatalities from political violence by subregion**



Source: Compiled using <https://acleddata.com/#/dashboard>

While civil unrest is linked to political change, it can also be attributed to the challenges of socio-economic development. Verisk Maplecroft, a leading risk analysis and strategic forecasting company, published its Civil Unrest Index in January 2020, which shows a significant uptick in civil unrest at the end of 2019 in Nigeria, Sudan and Zimbabwe. In Zimbabwe, this was attributed to subsidy cuts, while Sudan faced unrest following the ousting of President

Omar al-Bashir in April 2019. In Nigeria, a large element of the unrest relates to food security. Furthermore, the Global Peace Index identifies the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia and Zimbabwe as States facing significant risks of violent demonstrations (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2020). Of interest too are the results of surveys from the joint AU and United Nations GPS database on some of the types of tension leading up to violence.

**Table 11. Top causes of tension in States from the governance, peace and security survey data**

Country	Top causes of tension
Burundi (2014)	Territorial disputes, political factors, scarce natural resources
Cabo Verde (2016)	Rivalries between gangs, lack of employment for youth
Cameroon (2014)	Territorial disputes, economic competition, agropastoral conflicts
Côte d'Ivoire (2015)	Territorial disputes, political factors, economic competition
Madagascar (2015)	Economic competition, scarce natural resources, political factors
Mali (2018)	Gangs, ethnic differences, territorial disputes
Uganda (2017)	Gangs, territorial disputes, political factors

Source: AU and UN (2017).


It is important to note that levels of conflict alone do not determine levels of peace. Goal 13 of Agenda 2063 establishes entrenching a culture of peace as a target, to be measured by the level of trust citizens of the State (including those of a different nationality) have in government, overall levels of safety and where people usually go to get help in resolving a conflict. Afrobarometer data shows that Africans have generally high levels of tolerance towards other ethnicities, religions and nationalities, but not towards sexual minorities. According to the data, three out of 10 Africans consider that members of their ethnic group are sometimes, often or always treated unfairly by the government (Afrobarometer, 2020). As such, it is the political manipulation of ethnic divides, rather than ethnicities themselves, that tend to drive conflict, and therefore greater attention needs to be paid to inclusive governance. Moreover, drivers of violence

in Africa have been found to include high levels of poverty and exclusion, a history of conflict, a bad neighbourhood, external actors, poor governance, regime dissonance, regime type and a youthful population (Cilliers, 2018).

## 7.3 Safety and security

Closely related to organized violence is the question of safety and security. This refers to the ability of individuals, families and communities to live without fear of physical harm, abuse and intimidation, including violence against children. In terms of comparable data, some safety indicators have been measured by the Africa SDG Index and Dashboards Report (2019) and are presented in Figure 36.

**Figure 36. Scoring of States according to safety and security indicators**



Source: SDGC/A and SDSN (2019).

The Index shows that a small number of States have progressed in terms of reducing the number of victims of homicides and feeling safe walking alone at night, but that the number of States facing major or significant challenges remains quite high across all three measures. Table 12 shows the number of States by subregion in which safety and security are considered to be deteriorating. It should be noted that data are missing for Djibouti, Libya and Sudan, all three of which have had security concerns due to ongoing governance challenges.

**Afrobarometer data shows that Africans have generally high levels of tolerance towards other ethnicities, religions and nationalities.**

**Table 12. Safety and security deterioration by subregion**

Subregion	Countries
Eastern Africa	Ethiopia, Madagascar, Tanzania, Uganda, South Sudan
Central Africa	Cameroon, Chad, Congo, Gabon
Western Africa	Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Liberia, Niger, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Togo
Northern Africa	Morocco
Southern Africa	Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Source: SDGC/A and SDSN (2019).

The Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) also measures levels of safety in Africa. Scores in the categories of 'Personal Safety' and 'National Security' show a significant decline over the last decade; these indicators are among the three that have deteriorated the most (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2019). In these two subcategories, 29 States experienced a deterioration, while 16 experienced an improvement. However, while the decline in 'Personal Safety' is slowing, it is quickening for 'National Security' (falling almost twice as much in the last five years as in the rest of the decade). There are stark differences between States in this category, with 13 States scoring higher than 90.0 and Somalia and South Sudan

receiving scores as low as 17.1 (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2019). This trend reflects a growing militarization on the continent. Central Africa tends to score worst on national security, while Southern Africa fares best. This may be because many parts of Central Africa continue to face ongoing conflict, which spills across borders. Furthermore, weak institutional structures and poor governance can result in efforts to destabilize the government, leading to challenges in national security. Table 13 shows the highest and lowest scoring States for 'National Security' and demonstrates that top scoring States are ones with democratic tendencies, whereas the lowest scoring are often those where the government is involved in the conflict.

**Table 13. National security: highest and lowest scoring States**

Highest scoring States	Lowest scoring States
Cabo Verde	Democratic Republic of the Congo
Mauritius	Central African Republic
Seychelles	Sudan
Botswana	South Sudan
Namibia	Somalia

Source: Mo Ibrahim Foundation (2019).

In general terms, personal safety is getting worse due to a number of factors. These include growing social unrest and the perception of increasing government violence against civilians, as seen in States such as Burundi, Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Mozambique, Senegal, Uganda and Zambia. Civil unrest is particularly prevalent in States with significant unemployment, socio-economic inequalities and government corruption, such as Ethiopia and Nigeria. Personal safety is also dependent on a strong police force. Improvements have, however, been made in the reliability of police services, with more than 30 States improving their score between 2014 and 2017, despite an overall low average score of 35.9 out of 100 (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2019).

Africa also continues to fare badly in terms of terrorism, although there is still a lack of reliable sources of data on this indicator. In particular, Nigeria has seen an increase in terrorist activity in the last few years due to Boko Haram, and this has spilled over into Cameroon, Chad and Niger. Although Mali saw a decrease in attacks in 2019, there was an increase of 41 percent in the total number of deaths as a result of several mass casualty attacks (Miller, 2020). In Mozambique, an Islamist insurgency began in 2017, and although the government continues to blame foreign fighters, there is evidence to suggest that there are also home-grown elements, which have been radicalized due to under-development in the province and the lack of economic prospects (Kleinfeld, 2020). Somalia also continues to face the threat of the terrorist group Al-Shabaab, which has also attacked Kenya, whose government has been providing peacekeeping troops.

Despite regional measures to combat terrorism, such as the Algiers Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, adopted in 2002, and subregional efforts by Regional Economic Communities, such as the Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS), to create a counter-terrorism strategy and implementation plan, there are continued challenges in implementation. These include difficulties in enforcing legislation at the national level, in developing fair and effective criminal justice systems within States, and in preventing the acquisition of small arms and light weapons. Terrorism has been linked to under-development and requires comprehensive responses (UN, 2020a). Therefore, a holistic and developmental approach to terrorism is needed to prevent it spreading further across the African continent by 2030.

## 7.4 Justice


A fair and independent judiciary is an important component of the Peace Pillar. However, data collected by Afrobarometer show a number of barriers to a fair and independent judiciary, including court costs that are high for the average citizen, corruption, lack of legal counsel and concerns about fairness. An Afrobarometer survey found that 43 percent of people trusted the courts “not at all” or just a little, while 33 percent believed that most or all judges and magistrates were corrupt. Only 13 percent had had contact with the courts in the last five years (Logan, 2017).

The rule of law is also an important element of justice as it establishes a set of rules that elites must abide by, while also developing norms, values and beliefs for citizens to adhere to. The rule of law also encompasses access to justice (broadly understood to be the ability of citizens to seek and obtain remedies). Research by the IIAG show upward trends in the ‘Rule of Law’ subcategory, with improvements every year between 2014 and 2017, including more effective and secure access to justice and more independent judicial institutions. According to the IIAG, the States have, overall, performed fairly well in relation to the protection and enforcement of private contract and property rights, with an upward trend replacing an earlier decline (in line with the Africa SDG Index and Dashboards Report (2019)). In 2017, within the Rule of Law subcategory, Mauritius, Ghana, South Africa and Cabo Verde scored highest, while Eritrea, Libya, Somalia, South Sudan and Equatorial Guinea scored the lowest (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2019).

Overall, Western Africa has improved in relation to rule of law since 2014 and is now doing better than Southern Africa, whose score has fallen. Central and Eastern Africa have remained consistently low. In Western Africa, a number of States have ended violent conflicts and are now building institutions to enhance the rule of law, such as in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Southern Africa’s score remains relatively high due to strong institutions, but Botswana, Mozambique and South Africa have deteriorated significantly due to government involvement in judicial independence.



**Figure 37. Scoring by subregion on Rule of Law**



Source: Mo Ibrahim Foundation (2019).

## 7.5 Human rights and freedoms

Foundational democratic values and principles on the continent are built on the well-established principles of human rights, which are important to guarantee people's basic needs but also to protect them from abuse. However, human rights abuses continue to occur around the world, with some of the worst abuses taking place in Africa. This is seen in the protracted conflicts in States such as the Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and South Sudan, while in Cameroon, Mali, Nigeria and Somalia, armed groups have committed abuses and faced retaliation from State security forces that have also committed violations such as extrajudicial killings. Africa also faces the challenge of communal violence.

Human rights abuses have also stemmed from governments clamping down on opposition leaders and parties. Indicators that measure human rights in a broader sense are hard to quantify, but Amnesty International's 2019 Africa report claimed that in two out of three of the States monitored on the continent, freedom of expression was heavily restricted, with clamp downs on journalists, civil society groups and opposition, among other measures. There was also widespread repression of dissent (Amnesty International, 2020).

In terms of specific indicators, the African Union Development Agency's progress report (2020) shows that the proportion of people who believe that there is freedom of press and associated freedom of speech remains low, with the continent achieving only 13 percent of its 2019 target (42 percent) for this measure. Data from Afrobarometer (2019a) confirm this finding, although they also show that 43 percent of Africans see media freedom as increasing (compared with 32 percent who see it declining), but that this varies widely across States. Moreover, as noted by the APRM (2019), despite the African Charter on Human and People's Rights, individual government compliance remains low due to a lack of political will and insufficient funding for the African Commission on Human and People's Rights. In addition, the African Court on Human and People's Rights requires States to make a declaration accepting the competence of the Court before it can receive cases from them, but most States are yet to make this declaration. National human rights institutions also face numerous challenges, including a lack of resources or the autonomy to function.


## 7.6 Participation and active citizenry

Participation is also key to governance as it ensures that government decisions take citizens in account, reduces the potential for conflict and ensures that no one gets left behind. However, IIAG measures for the period 2008–2017 on civil liberties, such as freedom of expression and assembly, show that Africa's scores fell to their lowest point in 2017 (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2019). The surveys reveal that there has been a significant decrease in the number of Africans who think they are "somewhat" or "completely" free to say what they think (67 percent in the period 2016–2018). Most States have experienced declines, and many of these have been substantial. About 68 percent of Africans indicated that they must "often" or "always" be careful about what they say about

politics, representing a 9 percent increase in the last decade (Logan *et al.*, 2019).

According to a Mo Ibrahim Foundation survey (2019), participation in the continent is highest in West and Southern Africa. In the period 2014 to 2017, Western Africa improved its score while levels of participation fell in Southern Africa. Participation over the period was lowest in Central Africa, with Eastern Africa scoring slightly higher and Northern Africa a few points higher still (Figure 38). The low scoring in Eastern, Central and Northern Africa may be a function of weak institutional structures, while Western and Southern Africa generally have strong civil society mechanisms and defined laws that allow for such engagement.

**Figure 38. Scoring on civil participation by subregion**



Source: Mo Ibrahim Foundation (2019).

## 7.7 Corruption and transparency

Corruption is understood to be a major impediment to building capable and transformed institutions. Corruption hinders economic growth, good governance and certain freedoms, such as a citizen's right to hold governments to account. It also impacts strongly on service delivery, and hinders chances of a stable and prosperous future (Pring *et al.*, 2019). Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index shows that corruption is on the rise and that governments are not doing enough to fight this. People are also extremely concerned by the integrity of public officials. Worryingly, Africa (excluding Northern Africa) is the lowest scoring region in the Corruption Perceptions Index. Seychelles was the highest scoring African State in 2019, followed by Botswana and Cabo Verde, while Equatorial Guinea, South Sudan and Sudan scored the lowest (Transparency International, 2020). Congo has also witnessed backsliding in corruption, due to money laundering and the political elite embezzling public funds with impunity.

The Mo Ibrahim Index suggests progress was made between 2014 and 2017 in rooting out government corruption in Africa, while corruption in the private sector increased (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2019). Even so, Afrobarometer data showed that, in 2019, more than half of all African citizens believed that corruption had increased, and 59 percent of citizens rated their government's performance at fighting corruption as bad. Some 47 percent of respondents saw the police as corrupt; 39 percent saw government officials as corrupt; and 36 percent saw parliamentarians as corrupt (Afrobarometer, 2019b).

Looking more broadly at transparency and accountability, the IIAG shows some general improvements in this subcategory, noting that 34 States improved their score between 2014 and 2017. However, the average score was 35.3—the lowest score across all IIAG subcategories. Central Africa had the lowest scores overall, followed by Eastern Africa, Western Africa and Southern Africa, where high levels of corruption had remained fairly constant since 2014. Of particular concern was transparency related to the laws and records of State-owned companies, where the continent scored an average of 17.1, demonstrating that corruption severely impacts the effectiveness of the public and private sectors. Transparency improved, in general, in relation to access to public and legislative information and access to records of State-owned companies (despite the very low average score for this indicator).

The States showing ongoing deterioration and improvement, as well as the highest and lowest scoring States, are listed in Table 14. Those scoring highly have put in place specific mechanisms to root out corruption, while those scoring lowest lack such mechanisms and continue to be plagued by conflict and weak institutions. Rwanda, for example, has introduced an online procurement system for public tenders, as well as taking a zero-tolerance policy towards those involved in corruption. This in contrast to South Africa, where corruption derailed most of the State's development efforts during President Zuma's administration.

**Table 14. Transparency and accountability State ratings**

Deterioration	Lowest scoring States	Improvements	Highest scoring States
Comoros	Equatorial Guinea	Benin	Rwanda
Congo	Somalia	Egypt	Botswana
Gabon	South Sudan	Mauritania	Mauritius
Namibia	Guinea-Bissau	Morocco	Namibia
	Sudan	Tanzania	Cabo Verde
		Zimbabwe	

Source: Mo Ibrahim Foundation (2019).

## 7.8 Summary observations

Based on current trends, Africa, as a whole, is unlikely to achieve any of its goals for peace, security and governance. In general terms, the slow progress in improved governance is exerting the greatest drag on the Peace Pillar. There has also been a decline in democratic values, challenges in holding free and fair elections, and unconstitutional changes of government. Africa underperforms on the rule of law, lacking in some cases even basic governing functions, such as civil registration systems. Human rights abuses and limits on participation also hinder progress. Furthermore, rampant corruption remains a threat to governance, peace

and security. Rather than seeing a convergence around African democratic practices, the gap between democracies and authoritarian States is likely to widen further by 2030. Currently, armed groups have failed to heed the calls for a global ceasefire and conflict looks set to continue in hot spot areas across the continent. In addition, changes in climate and urbanization, a growing demographic youth bulge, unequal access to resources, and rising unemployment may drive governance, peace and security trends further downward, with these trends reinforcing one another.



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The challenges for governance, peace and security come from various areas, with nuances across the subregions, derived from different historical contexts. However, all these challenges are interlinked, as conflict often results from poor governance and exclusion. The case of Mali is illustrative in showing that corruption, exclusion and chronic under-development can be drivers of conflict, while the case of Seychelles demonstrates the importance of building accountable and inclusive institutions.

Despite the AU's significant progress in developing frameworks, instruments and structures to promote governance, peace and security and to promote a shift towards conflict prevention, more needs to be done to uphold these instruments and to hold member States to account. In this regard, political will and the efforts of governments to monitor governance, peace and security is critical. In an encouraging survey of African governments by the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) and UNDP, responses showed that political commitment to SDG 16 is high and that some national governments are making an effort to collect data on this goal. However, the survey showed that only 16 percent of governments have put aside national funding for this specific purpose (Laberge, 2019). Thus, much more can be done to incorporate SDG 16 into national planning, budgeting, monitoring and reporting.

**In an encouraging survey of African governments by the South African Institute of International Affairs and UNDP, responses showed that political commitment to SDG 16 is high and that some national governments are making an effort to collect data on this goal.**



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# Pillar Five: Partnership



# 8. Pillar Five: Partnerships

	2030 Agenda	Agenda 2063
Partnerships	17. Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development	19. Africa as a major partner in global affairs and peaceful co-existence  20. Africa takes full responsibility for financing her development

This chapter examines the Partnerships Pillar and the related goals in the 2030 Agenda and Agenda 2063 that call for a comprehensive set of actions by States to mobilize domestic, international and other sources of finance, expand partnerships for trade, and accelerate innovation and technology diffusion, among other aims. The Partnership Pillar also closely mirrors the Addis Ababa Action Agenda that was adopted at the Third International Conference on Financing for Development in Addis Ababa in July 2015 and subsequently endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly later that same month. The Action Agenda established a new global framework for financing sustainable development by aligning all financing flows and policies with economic, social and environmental priorities. The goals from the 2030 Agenda and Agenda 2063 that come under this Pillar reflect the common understanding that what had been the historical model of African development up until 2015 was not adequate to meet the ambitions for sustainable development, and that new financing models and partnerships were needed to finance the investments required to achieve the goals and aspirations of both declarations.

The pre-2015 model was predicated on the use of official development assistance (ODA) to underwrite large portions of the operating and development budgets of many African States. Domestic revenue generation was not sufficient to cover basic recurrent expenditures, although it presented the most predictable and robust source of financing at the State level. By 2015, there was common recognition that African governments needed to deploy a much wider and deeper ‘toolkit’ of instruments that would involve multiple financial streams, resulting in more sustainable and equitable economic growth capable of underwriting the development aspirations found in each State’s long-term vision statements, including commitments to the 2030 Agenda and Agenda 2063.

While many elements of the Partnerships Pillar are associated with SDG 17 and Goals 19 and 20 of Agenda 2063, the discussion which follows focuses on the critical role of financial flows that act as the ‘lubricant’ necessary for African governments to achieve the 2030 Agenda and Agenda 2063. It is clear that the availability and effectiveness of resource flows are highly dependent on an enabling environment of policies and programmes that allow the resources to be generated and used productively. This chapter looks at trends in the composition of financial flows from both domestic and international sources, broadened partnerships for trade and innovation from a number of different sources.

## 8.1 Domestic resource mobilization

Domestic resource mobilization is no doubt the most important indicator of how well a State is doing in terms of meeting the Agenda 2063 goal of Africa taking full responsibility for financing her development. The greater the ability of African governments to finance their own development priorities through internal means, the higher the likelihood that progress will be achieved over the long term—provided that governments have effective policies and programmes that promote equitable and sustainable economic growth and social inclusion. In the analysis below, two measures are used to determine Africa’s success in mobilizing domestic resources: (i) the level of revenues compared with GDP, and (ii) the level of government budgets paid from domestic taxes. The analysis includes comparisons with other developing regions and among subregions.




### Total government revenue as a proportion of gross domestic product

Figure 39 shows government revenues as a proportion of GDP from 2011 to 2018. On average, Africa's domestic revenue generation as a proportion of GDP lags behind other world regions. For instance, in 2018 Africa's average

revenue-to-GDP ratio (19.3 percent) was lower than the world average (31.1 percent), that of Latin America and the Caribbean (22.8 percent) and of South-Eastern Asia (21.3 percent). All three of the developing regions show declining revenues to GDP ratios between 2011 and 2018, while the world average remains relatively constant for the period.

Figure 39. Revenues as a percentage of gross domestic product by developing region (2011–2018)



Source: Compiled using [www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2021/October](http://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2021/October)




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Figure 40 compares revenues to GDP ratios for the five subregions. Southern Africa had the highest ratio for the time period but experienced a significant drop over a six-year period, falling from 40.3 percent in 2013

to 28.4 percent in 2018. Central Africa also saw a significant decline, from almost 35 percent in 2011 to 18.3 percent in 2018. Western Africa's ratio increased slightly over the period, reaching 20.4 percent in 2018.

**Figure 40. Revenues as a percentage of gross domestic product by subregion (2011–2018)**



Source: Compiled using <https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2021/October>

Potential reasons for low revenues to GDP ratios in Africa include inefficiencies in tax administration, leakages through corruption, and illicit financial outflows. Another major problem is the prevalence of a narrow tax base due to large informal sectors in many Africa States. The problem of low revenue collection is particularly notable in States endowed with a wealth of natural resources such as diamonds, minerals and petroleum. Rampant corruption and weak institutions consistently undermine domestic revenue collection, causing most of these States to rely on external donor funds to finance some portion of their annual budgets—a situation known as ‘the natural resource curse.’


**Domestic resource mobilization is no doubt the most important indicator.**

## Government budgets and domestic taxation

Another way to measure the efficiency of domestic resource mobilization is to look at the portion of government spending that is covered through domestic taxes. Figure 41 shows, as a percentage, the ratios of taxation to government spending for Africa and other regions, for the period 2011 to 2018. The data show that the annual proportion of domestic budgets funded by domestic taxes in Africa increases from

61 percent in 2011 to 67.8 percent in 2018, and that in 2015, Africa's ratio begins to exceed the world ratio. However, the region lags behind South-Eastern Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean (except for in 2018, when it pulls just ahead of Latin America and the Caribbean). Moreover, despite reaching 67.8 percent in 2018, Africa has still not achieved the 75 percent annual target needed to finance Agenda 2063, as called for in the first ten-year implementation plan of the Agenda.

**Figure 41. Government budget-to-taxation ratios for Africa and other regions**




Source: Compiled using <https://www.un.org/en/desa>

Figure 42 offers a comparison of tax-to-government-spending ratios, expressed as a percentage, for the five African subregions. Here, too, there is wide variation among the subregions, both over time and in comparison with one another. In Southern Africa, the proportion fell from over 80 percent in 2012 to 74 percent in 2018. Northern Africa also hovers around 74 percent by 2018. Central Africa consistently has the lowest tax-to-spending ratios of all the subregions, but also shows a significant increase over the eight-year period, rising from under 40 percent to just over 60 percent by 2018. Also by 2018, tax-to-spending ratios converge for Eastern and Western Africa, at around 68 percent. The data shows that only Northern and Southern Africa are close to the Agenda 2063 tax finance target of 75 percent.

Another way to measure the efficiency of domestic resource mobilization is to look at the portion of government spending that is covered through domestic taxes.

Figure 42. Taxation to government spending ratios by subregion (2011–2018)



Source: Compiled using <https://www.un.org/en/desa>

## 8.2 Official development assistance and remittances

### Official development assistance


Historically, official development assistance (ODA) has been an important instrument in realizing the development aspirations of African States. Its significance to Africa's development has been also strongly reiterated as recently as the declaration of the Addis Ababa Action Agenda from the Third International Conference on Financing for Development (United Nations, 2015b). However, too much reliance on development assistance alone is now understood to be a sub-optimal means for achieving sustainable development. Instead, multiple sources of financing are seen as key.

Before reviewing ODA trends, it is useful to first recall the commitments made by developed States to allocate a minimum of 0.7 percent of their respective gross national income (GNI) to assistance for developing States, including African States. Figure 43 gives an overview of the commitments of top and near-top-performing States in the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development

(OECD), as an average for the period 2011–2018. The data shows that there is still room for improvement in terms of OECD States meeting their commitments, with only four DAC States meeting their annual commitments of at least 0.7 percent of their respective GNIs ([www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-data/](http://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-data/)).

**Commitments were made by developed States to allocate a minimum of 0.7 percent of their respective gross national income to assistance for developing States.**

**Figure 43. Average official development assistance (as share of gross national income) commitments by members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Assistance Committee (2011–2018)**



Source: Compiled using [www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-data/](http://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-data/)


In terms of ODA disbursements to the African region, Eastern Africa had the highest ODA trend from 2014 to 2018, with disbursements increasing from US\$1.152 billion in 2014 to US\$1.357 billion in 2018. Disbursements were second highest in Northern Africa, despite declining from \$1.172 billion in 2014 to US\$791 million in 2018. In Western Africa received the third largest amount of ODA, which grew steadily from US\$799 million in 2014 to \$874 million in 2018. Central and Southern Africa received the smallest proportion of ODA over the time period, although ODA in Central Africa did increase, from US\$589 million in 2014 to US\$663 million in 2018.

Given the wide variability of average ODA inflows across the continent, analysis of ODA recipients within each subregion reveals significant differences. Thus, in Eastern Africa, the top three ODA recipients are Ethiopia (US\$3.992 billion), Tanzania (US\$2.518 billion) and Kenya (US\$2.456 billion), while the States receiving the least are Seychelles (US\$10 million), Mauritius (US\$49 million) and the Comoros (US\$70 million). In Northern Africa, the top three recipients are Egypt (US\$2.119 billion), Morocco (US\$1.810 billion) and Sudan (US\$896 million), while the States receiving the least

are Algeria (US\$139 million), Libya (US\$256 million) and Mauritania (US\$327 million).

In Western Africa, the top three recipients are Nigeria (US\$2.814 billion), Ghana (US\$1.309 billion) and Mali (US\$1.299 billion), while Guinea-Bissau (US\$134 million), Cabo Verde (US\$141 million) and the Gambia (US\$163 million) receive the least. In Southern Africa, States receiving the most ODA are Mozambique (US\$1.817 billion), Malawi (US\$1.202 billion) and South Africa (US\$1.122 billion), while those receiving the least are Botswana (US\$88 million) and Lesotho (US\$121 million). Finally, in Central Africa, recipients of the highest annual ODA on average are the Democratic Republic of the Congo (US\$2.381 billion), Cameroon (US\$932 million) and the Central African Republic (US\$554 million), while States receiving the lowest amounts are Equatorial Guinea (US\$5 million), São Tomé and Príncipe (US\$44 million) and Gabon (US\$95 million).

**Figure 44. Distribution of official development assistance by subregion (2014–2018)**



Source: Compiled using [www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-data](http://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-data)

The subregional and State-level assessment suggests that high ODA inflows might be associated not only with the size of a State, but with other factors such as conflict and natural disasters. For instance, in Eastern Africa where the subregional inflows were highest, there are several factors that may have caused this spike, including armed conflicts and natural disasters. These natural disasters escalated food security crises, leading to further conflict. Thus, despite being a small State in term of population, and an oil-exporting economy, South Sudan was one of the highest recipients of ODA (US\$1.797 billion) in the continent.


Similarly, cyclones in Southern African States like Malawi, Mozambique and South Africa in 2015 and 2016 may have caused the spike in ODA in those three States, with the comparatively large size of South Africa being less relevant. Likewise, in Western Africa, the Ebola virus outbreak in 2014 and 2015 may be partly responsible for the high average ODA received over the period 2014–2018 by the worst affected States in the region: Liberia (US\$773 million) and Sierra Leone (US\$772 million). To disaggregate the data, Liberia received US\$750 million in 2014 and then US\$1.094 billion in 2015, at

the height of the Ebola virus outbreak that devastated the State. ODA to Sierra Leone also increased in those two years, reaching US\$914 million in 2014 and US\$947 million in 2015.

### Remittances

Remittances are vital sources of capital formation that stimulate economic and livelihood activities in the economies of LICs and MICs by going directly to the recipient households. Remittances are thus vital to households across Latin America and the Caribbean, Southern and South-Eastern Asia, and Africa. Data from the World Development Indicators show that, from 2011 to 2018, average annual remittances as a percentage of GDP was 3.7 percent in Africa, higher than South-Eastern Asia (2.7 percent) and Latin America and the Caribbean (1.3 percent). The trend for Africa was however lower than for the category of 'least developed countries' (Figure 45).

**Figure 45. Average remittances as a percentage of gross domestic product by region (2011–2018)**




Source: Compiled using <https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators>

At the subregional level, Western Africa has the highest average remittance rate as a percent of GDP (6.1 percent), followed by Northern Africa (3.9 percent), Southern Africa (3.5 percent) and Eastern Africa (3.0 percent), while Central Africa has the lowest rate at 2 percent (Figure 46). In terms of

all of Africa's remittances for the 2011–2018 period, Western Africa accounts for 33 percent, Northern Africa for 21 percent, Southern Africa for 19 percent, Eastern Africa for 16 percent and Central Africa for 11 percent.

**Figure 46. Comparison of subregional remittances as a percentage of gross domestic product and of all African remittances (2011–2018)**



Source: Compiled using <https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators>



It is also useful to recognize the wide variations in remittances flows between States within each subregion. This data is presented in Table 15.

Table 15. Country variation in remittance flows within subregions

Subregion	Highest remittance rates	Lowest remittance rates
Northern Africa	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Egypt (7.2%)</li> <li>• Morocco (6.5%)</li> <li>• Tunisia (4.7%)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Algeria (0.7%)</li> <li>• Mauritania (1.4%)</li> </ul>
Eastern Africa	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The Comoros (12.1%)</li> <li>• South Sudan (4.8%)</li> <li>• Uganda (4%)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Tanzania (0.9%)</li> <li>• Mauritius (1.2%)</li> <li>• Ethiopia (1.5%)</li> <li>• Seychelles (1.5%)</li> </ul>
Western Africa	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Liberia (17%)</li> <li>• Cabo Verde (11.1%)</li> <li>• The Gambia (10.6%)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Guinea (0.9%)</li> <li>• Côte d'Ivoire (1.1%)</li> <li>• Sierra Leone (1.45%)</li> </ul>
Central Africa	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• São Tomé and Príncipe (5.3%)</li> <li>• Democratic Republic of the Congo (3%)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Gabon (0.1%)</li> <li>• Congo (0.4%)</li> <li>• Cameroon (0.8%)</li> </ul>
Southern Africa	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lesotho (20.1%)</li> <li>• Zimbabwe (9.8%)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Angola (0.01%)</li> <li>• Botswana (0.2%)</li> <li>• South Africa (0.3%)</li> <li>• Zambia (0.3%)</li> </ul>

Source: Compiled using <https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators>




**A positive step towards generating the financing and investment needed for raising GDP growth to achieve the SDGs and Agenda 2063.**

## 8.3 Foreign direct investment

This section examines foreign direct investment (FDI), a key element of financial flows, which also serves as a market-based barometer of Africa as an investment location. Figure 47 reveals that Africa is lagging considerably behind Latin America and the Caribbean and South-Eastern Asia in terms of attracting FDI; as a region, it is some three times less attractive than either South-Eastern Asia or Latin America and the Caribbean. Over the eight-year period, FDI to Africa was relatively flat, only rising from US\$45.6 billion in 2011 to US\$45.9 billion in 2018. Trends in FDI reflect such indicators

as the overall global economic outlook, State peace and security considerations, and risk calculations about prudent monetary and fiscal policies at the national level. The figure is also interesting in showing the downward trend of Latin America and the Caribbean as an investment destination, and the upward trend for South-Eastern Asia. The trends for all three developing regions reflect the perceptions of international capital markets on the viability and risk of each region as an investment destination.

**Figure 47. Foreign direct investment flows to Africa and other regions (2011–2018)**




Source: Compiled using <https://unctad.org/statistics>

Figure 48 presents the breakdown of Africa's FDI by giving the average annual FDI for all States within each subregion. Northern Africa has the highest FDI, averaging US\$2.36 billion by 2018. Southern Africa is the most volatile of the subregions, with FDI rising to nearly US\$1.9 billion in 2015, dropping to US\$0.93 million in 2015, and then rebounding to US\$4.22 million in 2018. Western Africa shows a downward FDI trend for the eight-year period, while Central Africa rises overall to finish with the second highest average FDI by 2018.

**The trends for all three developing regions reflect the perceptions of international capital markets on the viability and risk of each region as an investment destination.**

Figure 48. Average annual foreign direct investment for countries within each subregion (2011–2018)



Source: Compiled using <https://unctad.org/statistics>

In reviewing FDI by region and subregion for the eight-year period, the most worrisome trends are undoubtedly the flat rate of investment for the region as a whole, the volatility in FDI in Southern Africa, which should be an engine of investment, and the declining level of average FDI in Western Africa. None of these trends bodes well for Africa becoming the preferred location for foreign investment, despite the growing size of the region's population, with its potential as a market for new goods and services.

**This is a positive step towards generating the financing and investment needed for raising GDP growth.**

### **Comparison of Aid for Trade and foreign direct investment inflows**

Finally, it is useful to briefly compare Aid for Trade and FDI inflows. Aid for Trade in Africa increased from \$10.19 billion in 2011 to \$14.44 billion in 2018, values higher than those seen in Latin America and the Caribbean and South-Eastern Asia. This is a positive step towards generating the financing and investment needed for raising GDP growth to achieve the SDGs and Agenda 2063 (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 2019). By contrast, the annual average FDI inflows for Africa lagged behind other developing regions. Unlike Aid for Trade flows, which are primarily driven by development-focused goals, FDI inflows, as mentioned earlier, are typically influenced by competitive factors such as analysis of a State's economic outlook, peace and security conditions in the State, and the government's fiscal management policies. Regarding the distribution of total inflows, a time-series analysis by UNCTAD (<https://unctad.org/statistics>) estimated that Aid for Trade averaged 19 percent (US\$1.23 billion) of total development financing

over the period 2011–2018, whereas FDI inflows averaged 81 percent (US\$5.30 billion) of total development financing. Ideally, over time, the percentage of Aid for Trade would progressively decrease as Africa becomes a region of choice for FDI.

## 8.4 Debt management


Another component of development financing to be examined is debt management. Public debt is a form of borrowing, from either the local economy or from external creditors, that is used by States to help finance critical projects, such as for education, health, and infrastructure, thereby presumably contributing towards sustainable development. However, not all public debt is the same. Prudent debt management is critical for the sustainability of development gains. Thus, a major goal of both the 2030 Agenda and Agenda 2063 is for Africa to take full responsibility for its own development, including long-term debt sustainability. Understanding Africa's debt situation, both in terms of total debt owned and the resources spent on debt servicing, is an important part of achieving scrupulous debt management and ensuring that Africa takes responsibility for its own development goals.

It is also important to know why the problem of debt keeps recurring in the continent. For instance, what are the main purposes for which the bulk of Africa's debts are accumulated? Are the debts properly utilized or are they diverted to exorbitant and sometimes bogus projects? Are the debts being used for projects that meet needs under the People, Planet and Prosperity Pillars, and not just for the so-called 'thrive for prosperity' at the expense of the People Pillar? It is also crucial to understand how the debt is repaid—through domestic tax revenues or by 'digging a hole to cover a hole,' i.e. borrowing yet more money.

### External debt comparisons

Between 2011 and 2018, Africa had the highest level of annual debt as a percentage of GNI compared with other developing regions, such as Latin America and the Caribbean, East Asia and Pacific, and Southern Asia. As shown in Figure 49, Africa's average annual debt rate increased from 32.4 percent in 2011 to 45.4 percent in 2018, an increase of 13 percentage points, meaning that Africa's debt situation worsened during these years. Latin America and the Caribbean's debt also increased at a comparable rate but remained 8 percentage points lower than Africa's. By contrast, indebtedness in Southern Asia and East Asia and Pacific remained relatively unchanged over the period, hovering at around 20 percent of GNI.

**Figure 49. African indebtedness and comparator regions (percentage of gross national income, 2011–2020)**




Source: Compiled using <https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators>

## Debt servicing

From 2011 to 2018, in contrast to the debt accumulation rate, Africa's debt servicing rate was lower than that of Latin America and the Caribbean. However, it was higher than

that of Central and Southern Asia and, as Figure 50 shows, it rose over the period, reaching 8.5 percent of GDP in 2018. This rise has implications for development in the region as capital, already scarce, is spent on debt servicing instead of critical investments for sustainable development.

**Figure 50. Debt servicing in Africa and selected regions (percentage of gross domestic product, 2011–2018)**



Source: Compiled using <https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators>

In addition to the aggregate trends, it is useful to give some context to the wide variations in debt and debt servicing across the continent. Certain States in different subregions have higher debt rates but also undertake higher debt servicing, which should allow them to lower their burdens in the long term. In Northern Africa, Mauritania and Tunisia have the highest debt rates (83.7 percent and 67.3 percent, respectively), far above the subregional average (41.6 percent). However, Egypt is undertaking the highest annual debt servicing (11.1 percent), well above the subregional average of 7.3 percent, followed by Mauritania (10 percent), Tunisia (9.8 percent) and Morocco (7.5 percent). Algeria has the lowest debt rate, and also pays the least in debt servicing (0.5 percent) (<https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators>).

In Eastern Africa, Djibouti has the highest debt rate, at 151 percent on average, and a debt servicing rate of 8.3 percent. At this current repayment rate, the State is in a precarious

position in terms of sustainable debt management, given the possibility of rising interest rates and its potentially weak capacity to raise sufficient revenues to meet its obligations. The next most heavily indebted State in the region is Mauritius, with a 94.2 percent debt rate, although it pays only 1.1 percent in debt servicing per annum. In contrast, Ethiopia has a relatively low debt rate of 29.9 percent but the highest debt servicing rate at 13.4 percent, twice the subregional average of 5.9 percent.

In Western Africa, Cabo Verde, the Gambia and Sierra Leone have the highest debt rates at 86.5 percent, 46.1 percent and 38.3 percent, respectively, while the subregional average is 33 percent. The Gambia has the highest average debt servicing rate at 13.5 percent.

In Central Africa, São Tomé and Príncipe and the Republic of the Congo have annual debt rates of 74.4 percent and 40.3 percent, respectively, compared with a subregional average

of 34.8 percent. However, only São Tomé and Príncipe has a high debt servicing rate (9.5 percent), well above the regional average of 5.1 percent.

Southern Africa has the second highest average debt rate (43.5 percent) over the period under review (2011–2018), after Eastern Africa (44.9 percent). Four States in the region—Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Angola—have very high debt rates of 88.6 percent, 53.5 percent, 47.7 percent and 45.6 percent, respectively, which clearly contribute to raising the subregional average. However, with the exception of Angola which has an average debt servicing rate of 12.5 percent, most of the heavily indebted States in Southern Africa pay low debt servicing rates. This implies they risk paying more over time and are therefore at risk of not meeting global goals for sustainable debt management.

## 8.5 Summary observations

As explained in the introduction to this chapter, the Partnership Pillar covers many areas but attention was focused on development finance as a key lubricant and a barometer of the wide range of partnership opportunities. Analysis in previous sections has shown wide variations in development finance at the subregional and individual State

levels. The data presented suggests, as a general finding, that the majority of African States are not on track to take full responsibility for financing their development, in line with targets in the 2030 Agenda or Agenda 2063.

Africa lags behind the rest of the world in domestic resource mobilization, a critical factor for meeting the goal of becoming self-financing for development. Some of the recurring constraining factors include a narrow tax base and low investment in capacity-building for tax administration, presumably compounded by weak tax buoyancy. Additional impediments include leakages through corruption.

The second main finding of this chapter is that Africa's debt management situation is not sustainable. For instance, between 2011 and 2018, Africa's average debt ratio as a proportion of GNI increased by 22.2 percent (from 34.2 percent in 2011 to 39.6 percent in 2018) or 7.2 percentage points. At the same time, the debt servicing rate increased by 5.5 percentage points, from 3.0 percent in 2011 to 8.5 percent in 2018, equivalent to 183.3 percent of GDP. Africa's debt position has been compounded by COVID-19, with States acquiring more debt to respond to the pandemic and to finance recovery efforts.



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There is no discussion in this chapter of the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the development financing landscape. The pandemic's impact is that of 'a bull in a china shop,' significantly altering development finance beginning in 2020 and extending into 2021 and beyond. This is discussed in the next chapter. A blunt assessment is that if Africa's development financing was not on a sustainable path before COVID-19, then the pandemic has only exacerbated the situation, and it will be perhaps two to five years before African economies can return to pre-pandemic levels.

One alternative to this scenario is that African governments use the post-pandemic rebuilding of their economies to initiate many of the policy and institutional reforms that are long overdue. In all likelihood, there would be strong support from the international community for those States that make such a commitment. This alternative is discussed in more detail in the last chapter.

One alternative to this scenario is that African governments use the post-pandemic rebuilding of their economies to initiate many of the policy and institutional reforms that are long overdue.



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# Conclusions and recommendations

## 9. Conclusions and recommendations

The preceding chapters have presented a stark assessment of Africa's slow pace in meeting the goals of the 2030 Agenda and Agenda 2063. While there are some State exceptions, the general conclusion is that for all five Pillars, most African States (especially those in Africa, excluding Northern Africa) are not on track to meet the intended targets. The situation has been further exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, which has contributed significantly to the rising levels of poverty, food insecurity and undernutrition, diminished educational outcomes for millions of children, and slowed or even reversed economic growth. Moreover, the ramifications of new variants of the COVID-19 virus, unknown at the time of writing, could have even more serious consequences for both the health and socio-economic well-being of millions of Africans, especially the poor and marginalized.

A UNDP report (2020) summarized the crisis in these terms:

*The COVID-19 pandemic is unleashing a human development crisis. On some dimensions of human development, conditions today are equivalent to levels of deprivation last seen in the mid-1980s...The pandemic was superimposed on unresolved tensions between people and technology, between people and the planet, between the haves and the have-nots. These tensions were already shaping a new generation of inequalities—pertaining to enhanced capabilities, the new necessities of the 21st Century, as defined in the 2019 Human Development Report. But the response to the crisis can shape how those tensions are addressed and whether inequalities in human development are reduced.*

It is not an exaggeration to say that the current constellation of factors is potentially the greatest challenge confronting Africa since the independence era that began in the 1960s. Under such circumstances, African policy makers are confronted with the herculean task of designing appropriate responses that help their economies get back on track, meet the socio-economic needs of their citizens impacted by the pandemic, and recalibrate their policies and programmes to accelerate or re-start efforts to achieve the SDGs and Agenda 2063.

### 9.1 Strategic planning, budgeting and implementation

To this end, it will be important for policy makers to give increasing attention to the quality and effectiveness of the planning and budget prioritization process in the near term, so as to lay the foundation for longer-term budgeting and programming. At present, there is no shortage of policy advice and recommendations from by governments, partner agencies, non-governmental organizations, think tanks and advocacy groups that offer a whole range of options for encouraging and promoting human development and the 2030 Agenda and Agenda 2063. These different policy and programme recommendations certainly warrant careful consideration, but, ultimately, African governments will need to identify and then implement a strategic set of policy and programme choices that:

- are deemed priorities in their national context
- have the highest likelihood of generating significant changes
- can work synergistically
- have the best chance of being successfully implemented.

It is important to note that different governments will have different sets of priorities. To be successful, the prioritization process must have the full backing of society, achieved through dialogue, consultation and consensus. The task does not necessarily entail selecting and implementing a wide range of policy options, but rather, following an orderly and transparent process of prioritizing among multiple (and often contending) policy options, all of which place competing demands on scarce public resources.

To achieve the kind of transformation needed to recover and focus on their national development plans (including the SDGs and Agenda 2063), States will need to link their short-term priorities to their long-term development aspirations. This requires the ability to visualize futures different from the current trajectories that continue to impede sustainable development, while still addressing challenges and issues in the medium term.

Linking the short term to the long term requires governments to forego short-term politically and economically expedient decision-making on an almost daily basis in favour of making the tough political and economic choices that are involved in seeking long-term benefits.

Closely related to the notion of taking a long-term view is the understanding that, as COVID-19 has shown, governments can no longer take a 'business as usual' approach. Were this approach maintained, all social and economic classes would continue to be negatively affected, not just the poor and marginalized, further diminishing the likelihood of progress towards each State's development aspirations.

The importance of linking short- and medium-term targets to longer-term priorities cannot be overstated, but how does the process of prioritizing multiple demands manifest itself in government decision-making? While the priorities chosen are ultimately decided by individual governments, five guidelines are suggested to inform the policy and implementation debate that must precede these decisions:

- Which policies and programmes are most likely to improve the lives of those living on the margin and bring them into the economic mainstream through productive employment opportunities and improved social welfare?
- How can the stimulus packages that States have received for COVID-19 be used to accelerate needed reforms in terms of inclusive growth and stronger social safety net systems that reach the poor and marginalized?
- Are there opportunities to exploit multiplier effects, where one intervention can have an impact on multiple objectives for improved human development and security?
- In what ways are the views and concerns of stakeholders, particularly those lacking human security, being factored into the decision-making process?
- In situations where resources are shifted from one programme or initiative to another, can the shift be justified in terms of improved economic and social outcomes for the poor and marginalized?

## 9.2 Strengthening adaptive policies and institutional capacities

Jumpstarting and accelerating efforts to forcefully address SDGs will require governments to commit to strong, proactive and responsible governance frameworks that develop policies for both the public and private sectors. Such a commitment must be based on a long-term vision and leadership, shared norms and values, and rules and institutions that build trust and cohesion. At the same time, governments will need to have the capacity for flexibility and adaptation. In complex societies such as those in Africa, the outcome of any particular policy is inevitably uncertain. Governments will need to follow a governance framework that is pragmatic and be able to problem-solve and adapt collectively and rapidly.

There are many examples in Africa and throughout the Global South of States that have begun to transform the way their governments identify challenges, develop policy responses, and follow through with focused implementation strategies and aligned fiscal commitments. The response by governments to the COVID-19 crisis is one recent example of this. A shared characteristic of these States is that they are adept at modifying and shifting their policies and budget priorities as circumstances change. In most instances, such modifications are undertaken with the full support of the State's development partners.

What are some of the characteristics of highly flexible and adaptable governments? A few characteristics of direct relevance to sustainable development are as follows:

- **They are consistent and committed in their pursuit of developmental objectives, including gender equality.** Failing to achieve certain developmental objectives may, in fact, be an opportunity to learn, adapt and then to re-engage with fresh insights.
- **They are proactive.** The State is not relegated to the role of overseer, but rather, it actively participates in the development process, often serving as an entrepreneur of first (or last) resort.
- **They evolve their policy framework according to the changing needs of society.** Change is welcomed provided that it does not detract from the overall

- development objectives that the nation as a whole has set for itself.
- **They seek a socially legitimate, competent and neutral bureaucracy that is performance- and outcome-oriented** to ensure implementation and that actively engages with other stakeholders.
- **They value the presence and contribution of viable and vocal stakeholders** including the private sector, non-governmental organizations, civil society organizations and communities.
- **They are committed to reducing corruption and rent-seeking** because of their detrimental effects on inclusive growth and human development.

## 9.3 Identifying and implementing accelerators

The challenge of accelerating SDG implementation is not a new concern. In light of the COVID-19 experience, four underlying principles are proving to be of critical importance in 2021. They are:

- easing bottlenecks and blockages in moving from policy articulation to actual implementation
- helping to reach critical mass of supporting reforms in order to generate tipping points
- helping to contain or manage key 'derailing risks' (such as demonstrated by the pandemic, but applicable in other economic, social and governance domains)
- putting in motion constructive governance dynamics that generate well-functioning and positive feedback loops.

In looking to put the 2030 Agenda and Agenda 2063 back on track, government policy makers face the complex task of deciding which actions to undertake first out of a range of policy and programme options. In other words, they must achieve 'optimal sequencing,' deciding which policy measures are more important than others. Invariably, the challenge will require not simply choosing a series of individual policy measures, but choosing a bundle of policy

interventions—or accelerators—that are both synergistic and actionable in terms of available human and funding resources. In light of the analysis of the five Pillars, four examples of synergistic accelerators are discussed below that could result in improvements across all five Pillars and the SDGs and Agenda 2063 more generally. These accelerators take a functional rather than sectoral approach, thereby impacting multiple sectors in ways that could have medium- and longer-term benefits for sustainable and inclusive development. The functional accelerator approach implies increased investment in the chosen accelerators; analysis of the five Pillars suggests that accelerators relating to the People, Prosperity and Peace Pillars should be the priority.

### *Digitization and information technologies*

An important lesson of COVID-19 is that African governments should redouble their efforts to 'digitize' their economies and social services and bring their States in line with the digital infrastructure found in many parts of the Global South, not just in the developed States. As the pandemic demonstrated, online access is critical for improving the quality and reach of government services and for allowing the business community to become more productive and efficient. As an example, lack of access to technology was considered to be one of the biggest barriers for learning during the pandemic in the aftermath of school closures. Early childhood and primary-level students were considered to be the most likely to be disadvantaged by the crisis and the least likely to be able to access the technologies required for learning. Similarly, improved management in the health sector and digitization of health records are examples of how information technologies could make health services more responsive and effective. Finally, expanded access to digitization and information technologies could have tremendous benefits for the private sector, notably for small businesses and the informal sector, enabling entrepreneurs and farmers to make better and more informed business decisions. The rapid pace at which mobile phone technologies were adopted in virtually every African State demonstrates that there are viable opportunities for the public and private sectors to collaborate to bring about a rapid rollout of expanded information technologies.

## **Energy access**

If information technologies are to become widespread, then African States must move forcefully to address what has sometimes been called Africa's 'energy poverty.' As discussed in the Prosperity Pillar chapter, Africa lags behind other developing regions in per-capita access to reliable and affordable energy. While large energy projects are currently in the portfolios of many States, much greater attention and investment need to be focused on low cost, off-grid energy solutions and 'last-mile' energy infrastructure that reach rural and remote areas as well as poor urban and peri-urban communities. Such access would allow underserved and marginalized households opportunities to increase their productivity and to improve their earnings potential and, hopefully, to become consumers of more goods and services, thereby creating positive economic and social feedback loops. Large energy projects obviously require significant capital investments, but off-grid and last-mile energy solutions represent opportunities for joint public-private partners and significantly smaller outlays of capital. They do, however, require a regulatory environment that encourages investments of this type. The increasing affordability of renewable energy, notably solar and wind technologies, is another incentive for expanding their use and access to them, using local companies as the main drivers for this kind of energy infrastructure.

## **Trade, supply chains and regional cooperation**

Even before the COVID-19 pandemic, African States faced major obstacles to expanded trade and regional integration. The pandemic put on hold the regional trade aspirations embodied in the AfCFTA trade agreement as States went into lockdown, closed their borders, and restricted cross-border trade and the movement of people. Assuming that the next wave(s) of COVID-19 can be contained, giving much greater attention to regional integration should be a priority for African governments. Renewed commitments to regional integration can be a major driver for improving sustainable development. The Regional Economic Communities, such as the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa and the Eastern African Community, have been important levers for reducing barriers to trade and expanding the flow of human and capital resources across borders. Reductions in non-tariff barriers can also be an important component of expanded economic integration and help to link States through beneficial webs of economic cooperation and common economic, social and political visions. AfCFTA holds the promise of even wider integration and cooperation as it begins to become operational. Likewise, the kinds of initiatives that encourage cross-border analysis and

collaboration around common social and environmental challenges should be more actively promoted. It is also hoped that there will be an enhanced role for regional institutions in mitigating subregional conflict and promoting peace, in order to finally end the ethnic and political divisions that have brought such horrendous death and destruction.

## **Youth at the centre of development efforts**

It has long been known that Africa is, demographically, a young continent. In 2020, the median age across all African States was 19.7 years, compared with the global median age of over 30 years. The youth of Africa are both the promise and the peril of African societies, and how governments confront the momentous challenge to assimilate them into their economies and societies can have enormous, multigenerational effects, both positive and negative. A focus on youth as a comprehensive development accelerator strategy could work through multiple sectors, encompassing jobs creation and skills training, gender equality in educational access and employment, improved health services for girls and young women, expanded access to financial services, and a greater role in public consensus-building. Ignoring or downplaying the importance of a youth-focused development strategy as an accelerator could lead to greater numbers of youth not completing their education, not finding productive employment in an increasingly global economy, not seeing greater gender equality, and not feeling a part of the most vibrant aspects of African society. Greater focus on youth could also hope to dampen the kinds of alienation and discontent that lead to conflict and civil unrest.

## **Promoting innovation**

Observers of successful companies have noted that crises and rapid change give rise to remarkable innovations and insights for dynamic and forward-looking enterprises. Such alacrity should also be the case for African governments as they address ongoing COVID-19 challenges and look to the post-pandemic future. For such innovation to occur in the African context will first require an honest and thorough examination of the foundational nature of improved governance institutions, services, laws and regulations. Innovation is more likely to happen when the enabling environment presented by government is seen as responsive, accountable and inclusive. Some of the indicators for measuring good governance would include metrics related to control of corruption, regulatory quality, economic freedom, controlling rent-seeking behaviour by economic

elites, and allowing civic and political freedom. Under these conditions, innovative approaches for solving all kinds of development challenges, at the household, community or national level, are likely to flourish. With respect to innovation, African States have much to learn from each other, both about the common elements of the challenges States face, and about what has and has not worked to date. The focus of such cooperation should be on sharing tools, strategies and experiences across sectors, from large infrastructure projects to community-based interventions, all of which need to drive innovation, learning and upscaling of successes. In short, an environment that promotes innovation and risk-taking is one that is well-suited to give renewed attention to the SDGs and Agenda 2063.

## 9.4 Concluding observations

This report has sought to present a candid assessment of current efforts by African governments to meet the challenges of the 2030 Agenda and Agenda 2063, using analysis of the five Pillars. While there are wide variations in

the efforts and achievements of different African States in relation to these and other development goals, many States are significantly behind schedule, as African policy makers and observers are well aware. This is one of the reasons the UN Secretary-General called for 2020–2030 to be the ‘Decade of Action.’ It is also apparent that the COVID-19 pandemic is creating substantial uncertainty for African governments about how best to proceed to simultaneously mitigate the effects of the pandemic (with no clear end date in sight) and continue current development efforts.

The identification of accelerators, as suggested above, is seen as a way of developing policy and programmatic approaches that can leverage efforts that transcend specific sectors and can be applied both to address a pandemic of indefinite duration and to re-start stalled, long-term development efforts. Although the accelerators chosen will vary from one State to another, it is hoped that having this focal point for policy design and implementation will help States meet the important objective of bringing synergies and greater resources efficiencies to the development challenges confronting Africa in the foreseeable future.



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# Annex



# Annex A.

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United Nations  
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